U-boat Archive - Auxiliary Cruiser KTB

Auxiliary Cruiser Pinguin (Ship 33 - HSK 5)

Part 4

19 September to 7 December 1940

Translation by Jerry Mason










			K r i e g s t a g e b u c h
			-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-
			of

			S h i p 3 3
			==========================






			Kommandant:	Kapitän zur See K r ü d e r

			Beginning:	on 19 September 1940
			Concluding:	on 7 December 1940.





			Enclosures: 20 - 33



				© U-boat Archive 2025 - all rights reserved

Click the flag to view the above page from the original German KTB

- 113 -

MOZ 75°E

[GMT +5 MOZ = Local Mean Time]

========

19.09.40

29°50'S 73°17'E

Ship 33 began its advance to the east on 30°S latitude.

SEbyE 6, Sea 5, cloudy, clear, Vis. good







Establishing the
towing connection.
Prize No. 1
"NORVARD"














Fuel oil delivery to
"NORDVARD"

- 114 -

continued

19.09.40










Farewell of the
prisoners.

Captain H. H a n s s e n of the Norwegian M.S. "NORVARD" said the following when questioned by the Prisoner Officer.

The motor ship "NORVARD" is 4111 GRT, belonged to the Shipping Firm Lauritz Klister in Oslo and was on the way from Bunbury (Australia) for Port Elizabeth (South Africa) with 7187 tons of wheat in sacks. The ship had left Bunbury on 5 September and was expected in Port Elizabeth on 25 September.

When stopped by a German auxiliary cruiser (and even before) had not telegraphed. Since leaving Bunbury had sighted no ships. The main cargo was taken over in Thevenard, then called on Fremantle briefly, to get further orders for cargo and finally in Bunbury the cargo was completed. Shipper is the "Australian Wheat Board", receiver the "South African Wheat Industry" in Port Elizabeth. Cargo papers were not delivered to him, he also had refused course instructions given to him by the Custom Officer in Bunbury, which forced him to proceed to the north, to avoid the bad weather area and save oil. The fuel oil inventory amounted to about 100 tons on 16 September. Warships were not seen in Australia also heard nothing about warship movements.

- 115 -



	continued
	19.09.40	No other ships were seen in Bunbury. For about 3 weeks he had heard that a German raider operated in the Tasman Sea. He knew nothing of auxiliary cruisers in the Indian Ocean. Telegrams were hardly ever sent, because the general instruction was to maintain radio silence. In Bunbury, a very small harbor, there was only his ship.
		So much for the statements made by Captain Hansen at the first interrogation
		On 17 September interrogated for the second time, Hansen admitted that he had not told the full truth the previous day. He corrected his information as follows:
		He was given course directions at Bunbury telling him to steer from Bunbury course to 30°10'S and 50°E, from there true west to 34th or 35th longitude, then a few miles due North and direct course to Port Elizabeth. As ordered, he destroyed these course instructions and the "Bill of Lading" immediately after being stopped.
		In Bunbury he lay with three other ships, namely 2 Yugoslavians and 1 coastal steamer. The departure date and destination of the voyage of these ships were unknown to him.
		He had not been able to determine aircraft reconnaissance himself, but he remembered having heard from his officers that aircraft were observed about 50-100 nm from the coast between 06.00 and 07.00 hours.


		The First Officer K. H a l s e and the III. Officer S. M i d t h a s s e l from the Norwegian M.S. "NORDVARD" said:
		Before she went to Australia, the "NORDVARD" lay in Laurenco-Marques (Portuguese East Africa) together with 3 German ships. The Captain's statements about the ship, cargo and port locations were confirmed. There was no telegraphy. Both officers performed telegraphy service part time. The nautical charts with drawn courses in were destroyed by them when they stopped, as this

- 116 -



	continued
	19.09.40	was ordered in the course instructions they had received in Bunbury. They had not seen the cargo papers. These and all other ship's papers were picked up by the Captain. The First Officer pointed out that the courses and navigation fixes given in the log book correspond to the courses actually driven. The crew, including the Captain, was 29 men.
		In the morning aircraft reconnaissance was observed at a distance of 100 to 200 nm off the Australian coast. In Bunbury they were lying with two Yugoslavians. The workers in Bunbury and Thevenard talked a lot about German raiders, but they all seemed rather confused; after all, it was difficult to understand the English of the Australian workers. They remembered them speaking of the South Atlantic and the Tasman Sea. They did not have anything to say about the movements of warships. They hadn't seen warships or patrol vessels.
		The Third Officer had the watch on the morning of 16 September, saw the Auxiliary Cruiser first and took it for a large "WILHELMSEN liner" on course for the Sunda Strait.



		33 as Wilhelmsen steamer

- 117 -



	continued
	19.09.40	He never thought of a German raider. When the Captain, who was on the lower bridge deck, came on the bridge, he reduced the speed in order to let the other ship pass quickly. He, Midthassel, was unable to discover anything about the sighted ship that would have struck him as suspicious. The stopping shot in front of the bow came as a great surprise to him. Together with the First Officer, he destroyed the nautical charts on which the courses were drawn because the First Officer asked him to do so. Besides, the whole situation was so new to him and so surprising that he was unable to give further thought to the events that were to happen next.
		He did not enter the radio station on 16 September. They did not have a code from the British Admiralty on board.

		After solving the new GBMS key, the GBMS radio messages that accrued since the key were changed were subsequently deciphered. On August 28th, the day after the bombardment and detachment of the tanker "BRITISH COMMANDER" Natal/Radio announced to all English merchant ships in the western Indian Ocean:
			"Enemy raider shot British merchant steamer in 29°37'S and 45°50'E at 02.40 GMT on 27 August. Possible description: 4000 ton ship, dark gray, 1 smokestack, 2 masts, smokestack even with cross trees, forward and aft well decks, sampson masts on the poop, straight forestem, cruiser stern, speed of a coal ship, in the vicinity of the mast no cannon or davits visible. Pay attention to Admiralty Instructions CF and CJ.
			S.N.O. Simonstown"

		Where this description came from is unknown, in any case is will be gratefully noted as incorrect.

- 118 -




	20.09.40	29°58'S 76°55'E	01.00 hours received an RRRR-report with a position 90 nm to the north of ours. The French 10000 ton steamer "COMMISAIRE RAMEL" reported therein that he was being shot at by an unknown ship. I accept that this was Ship 16, that unfortunately is very close and "33" is probably suspected further east.
	12.00	EbyS 4, Sea 3, overcast, Vis. good


	21.09.40	31°48'S 78°16'E
	12.00	NNE 2, Sea 1-2, overcast, Vis. good



		Due to the stay for the capture and outfitting of the prize "NORVARD", it is no longer possible, as planned, to lay the mines in Australia in the new moon period at the end of September.
		Therefore the execution of the mine task must be delayed until the end of October.
		Since I consider the moment of surprise to be indispensable for successfully carrying out a mine task under the enemy coast, I decide not to cross into actual Australian waters before deploying the mines, as a report must always be expected if the British are captured.
		Therefore I intend initially to cruise further on the eastern part of the northern Australian Africa Route between 30° and 35°S, as was evident from the log book of the "NORVARD".

	Sun and Moon Data 20.09.40
	Sun and Moon Data 21.09.40

- 119 -

22.09.40

31°49'S 81°57'E

12.00

N 3-4, Sea 3, cloudy, Vis. good

Made the following considerations for the mining operation on the Australian coast:

1)	The written instructions found and the oral statements of the Captains show that all ships are instructed to sail outside the 200-meter line wherever possible.

2)	Fouling Capes or other navigational objective points is pointless, because in most cases, it is possible to bypass using of greater or lesser detours, beyond 200 meters water depth.

3)	For mine laying comes into consideration:
	a)	On the east coast:	Brisbane, New Castle, Sydney, the east entrance to the Bass Strait, Bank Strait.

	b)	On the south coast	Hobart (southern tip of Tasmania), west entrance to the Bass Strait (Cape Otway), Spencer Gulf, Albany.

	c)	On the west coast:	Fremantle, Geraldton, Shark Bay.

4)	It is not possible to foul all places in a row with just one ship, as the first mine hit at that point will trigger defense and patrols accordingly in all other places.
	By using mines with clockwork delay (delay of up to 48 hours), a little compensation for this disadvantage is possible . There are

- 120 -

continued

22.09.40

		100 mines with this clockwork delay on board.

	5)	Contamination of several places on the south and east coast in one deployment period seems possible with this, so initially the west coast is disregarded.

	6)	The general approach to the ports of the east coast favors the shortest route across shallow water perpendicular to the coast. Patrols and regular aircraft reconnaissance must be expected on these approaches off the harbors.

	7)	Under these circumstances, the entrance to Bass Strait and the Bank Strait seem most suitable.

	8)	Attempting to foul the port of Hobart on the southern tip of Tasmania is also believed to be possible.

	9)	Ship 36 deployed mines at the west entrance to the Bass Strait, at Cape Otway. Because for a long time nothing has been heard concerning this, I believe these mines were cleared.

	10)	Nothing is known about other mining operations of Ship 36 in Australia. An expected message from the Skl. about this is not available.

	11)	A fouling in Spencer Gulf can therefore also come into question, although there are so many possibilities of circumvention that only one hit can be expected.

	12)	For the smaller port of Albany (fortified berthing and fueling station) what has been said about the eastern ports under 6) applies, only that patrols and reconnaissance will be less strong.

	13)	Using the possibilities available in the mines with clockwork delay, I intend to let the fouling take effect suddenly in as many places as possible at the same time.

- 121 -

continued

22.09.40

		I hope that this will not only have a greater effect on the enemy, but also the greater likelihood of being able to carry out the individual intentions without being disturbed by the mine actions that have already occurred.

	14)	This task could best be carried out with several ships at the same time. I intend to examine the next steamer I encounter for the possibility of its use as an auxiliary mine ship.

	15)	Since I consider the direct mining of the harbor approaches off Sydney to be possible only with the full commitment of the ship, with which perhaps only a single success would be bought, on the other hand I consider a fouling at one point on the long east coast to be desirable, I have envisaged fouling in shallow water between Sidney and New Castle. Here there is the possibility of damaging and disrupting the brisk traffic of the important coal field of New Castle as well as that to Sydney. Mines with a clockwork delay of 48 hours would have to be used here. This venture is planned as the first, as there are more favorable alternatives to the south.

	16)	Then I intend to foul the east entrance of Bass Strait, then Bank Strait and finally the entrance to Hobart each in one night.

	17)	Based on the experience then available and according to the current state of alarm, it must then be decided whether further tasks can be carried out, e.g. at the western entrance to Bass Strait and in the Spencer Gulf.

- 122 -




	MOZ 90°E	[GMT +6]
	========
	23.09.40	31°46'S 85°29'E	)
	12.00	WSW 3, Sea 2, overcast, rain, Vis. good to medium	)
		WSW 3, Sea 2, overcast, rain, Vis. good to medium	)
			)
			)
	24.09.40	31°00'S 86°26'E	)
	12.00	NNW 1, Sea 1, cloudy, Vis. good	)
		NNW 1, Sea 1, cloudy, Vis. good	) In N-S zigzags on
			) approximately 32°S
			) back and forth in position.
	25.09.40	33°53'S 86°30'E	)
	12.00	SE 4, Sea 3-4, cloudy, showers, Vis. good to medium	)
		SE 4, Sea 3-4, cloudy, showers, Vis. good to medium	)
			)
			)
	26.09.40	33°00'S 87°40'E	)
	12.00	E 6, Sea 5-6, overcast, rain, Vis. bad	)
		E 6, Sea 5-6, overcast, rain, Vis. bad	)



		The following two informative radio messages may serve to illuminate the recurring difficulties with regard to the crews of the enemy or neutral ships sailing for the enemy:

	Sun and Moon Data 23.09.40
	Sun and Moon Data 24.09.40
	Sun and Moon Data 25.09.40
	Sun and Moon Data 26.09.40

- 123 -



	continued
	26.09.40
			"Algoa-Bay/Radio keyed to GBMS 6 (South Africa) cde 40 CITY OF EXETER only from SNO Simonstown.

			Understand your crew may refuse sail beyond Capetown unless demand lodged Durban are met. Report in writing to naval control service officer Capetown on arrival. You will be berth in Bay pending investigation.

			From S.N.O. Simonstown"

		Open Radio Message of the Swedish steamer "PAN GOTHIA" to Singapore/Radio.

			"Swedish consulate Singapore.

			Expect arrive Saturday will authorities give permission shifting . . . (the crew) . . . and is fresh crew available. Need one second cook, one mess boy, one carpenter, five deckhands, three assistant engineers, one turner, four motormen and one motor apprentice please telegraph.
			janson master."


	27.09.40	30°19'S 89°17'E	)
	12.00	SW 3, Sea 2-3, cloudy, Vis. good	)
		SW 3, Sea 2-3, cloudy, Vis. good	)
			) Back and forth on north-south zigzags on
			) approximately 32°S.
			)
			)
	28.09.40	30°01'S 90°10'E	)
	12.00	ENE 3, Sea 2, cloudy, Vis. good	)
		ENE 3, Sea 2, cloudy, Vis. good	)

	Sun and Moon Data 26.09.40
	Sun and Moon Data 27.09.40
	Sun and Moon Data 28.09.40

- 124 -



	continued
	28.09.40	Finally the ship lay calmly enough that the spare aircraft could be taken from the lower hangar and prepared for flight.
		To do this, the lifting platform must be lifted out of the shaft and placed to the side of the deck, then the aircraft, hanging on the very long rigging of the steeply topped boom, had to be pulled out from the bottom of the shaft without a guide, also set down on the side of the deck, and then find its place on the platform that was then put back in place.
		The difficult work was successful without damage to the aircraft.

	- 125 -

	- 126 -

- 127 -




	29.09.40	30°14'S 90°54'E
	12.00	SWbyW 5, Sea 5, rain, overcast, Vis. good to bad


		Because so far no further vessels have come in sight on this route, I decide to try my luck on the advance to the east coast of Australia. I hope to be successful here on the routes to be crossed from Aden, Colombo, Calcutta and above all the Sunda Strait to Australia possibly with the help of aircraft reconnaissance.





	30.09.40	29°33'S 92°57'E	)
	12.00	WSW 8, Sea 6-7, overcast, rain, Vis. bad	)
		WSW 8, Sea 6-7, overcast, rain, Vis. bad	)
			) No particular events.
			)
	01.10.40	26°59'S 95°44'E	)
		W 5, Sea 4-5, cloudy, rain, Vis. good to bad	)
		W 5, Sea 4-5, cloudy, rain, Vis. good to bad	)

	Sun and Moon Data 29.09.40
	Sun and Moon Data 30.09.40
	Sun and Moon Data 01.10.40

- 128 -




	02.10.40	24°29'S 98°27'E	)
	12.00	SSE 2, Sea 1-2, cloudy, Vis. good	)
		SSE 2, Sea 1-2, cloudy, Vis. good	)
			)
			No particular events.
	MOZ		)
	105°E	[GMT +7]	)
	=====		)
			)
	03.10.40	22°09'S 101°08'E	)
	12.00	SEbyS 2, Sea 1, clear, Vis. good	)
		SEbyS 2, Sea 1, clear, Vis. good	)


	04.10.40	20°05'S 103°09'E	)
	12.00	SEbyE 4, Sea 3, cloudy, Vis. good	)
		SEbyE 4, Sea 3, cloudy, Vis. good	) Setting out and launching the aircraft is still not possible.
			)
	05.10.40	17°39'S 105°46'E	)
	12.00	E 2-3, Sea 2, clear, Vis. good	)


	06.10.40	15°16'S 108°00'E	The seas appear calmer. The aircraft was launched. Even after maneuvering to make a duck pond for the aircraft, the flight officer reports that take-off is only possible with full commitment. The aircraft was recovered, because at the moment a reconnaissance is arguably desirable but not necessary.
	12.00	ESE 3-4, Sea 3, clear, Vis. good

	Sun and Moon Data 02.10.40
	Sun and Moon Data 03.10.40
	Sun and Moon Data 04.10.40
	Sun and Moon Data 05.10.40
	Sun and Moon Data 06.10.40

- 129 -




	07.10.40	15°06'S 107°47'E	12 strich [138°] to port the mast of a steamer are in sight. Lays athwart. Approximate bearing 290°T.
	07.10	SEbyE 4-5, Sea 4, cloudy, Vis. good

	07.22		Went to full speed and took the steamer directly ahead. To the right of the two masts the smokestack comes in sight. Apparently it is a tanker.

	07.25		Came to an accompanying and unsuspicious course Lombok Strait - Capetown and ran with changing speed, so that the bearing was steady.
	07.36		Bearing 295°T 20600 meters.
			The steamer steers approximately 160° (Sunda Strait - South coast of Australia).

	07.46		300°T 17600 meters.
			After and bridge superstructure gray, bridge brown, smokestack black.

	07.50		Crew to Action Stations.

	08.16		308°T 8500 meters.
			Tanker with black hull, gray masts and booms. No neutrality markings, no cannon.
			Apparently Dutch or Norwegian, runs 9 knots by plotting, proceeded in such a way that the bearing shifted further astern, to prevent an escape maneuver.

	08.25		On passing through the masts his course was 160°.

- 130 -



	continued
	07.10.40
	08.29	Steamer was halted with a shot before the bow and flag signal:
		"Stop immediately!"

	08.30	Second shot before the bow, because the first shot was too far off and was probably not seen.
		Tanker stopped.

	08.31	Flag signal:
		"It is forbidden to transmit!"
		Tanker sent:
		"Understood!"

	08.35	Flag signal:
		"Where destined?"
		Tanker sent:
		"Understood"
		and showed the Norwegian flag.

	08.40	Tanker sent distinctive signal:
		"STORSTAD"

- 131 -



	continued
	07.10.40	Norwegian Motor tanker "STORSTAD", Oslo, 8998 GRT, built in 1926 in Glasgow, 2 propellers.

	08.42	Flag signal:
		"I send a boat!"
		On the tanker in the meantime the crew has run aft, boats were prepared.

	08.50	Once more flag signal:
		"Where are you destined?"

	08.53	Answer from tanker:
		"Melbourne!"

	08.58	Prize and Examination Commandos set off.

- 132 -



	continued
	07.10.40
	09.07		Semaphore message from Examination Officer:
			"Norwegian tanker "STORSTAD" from Borneo to Melbourne, 8998 GRT, 36 man crew, 10 knots, 12000 tons diesel and 500 tons bunker oil."

	09.12		Questioned the Examination Officer reports that there are provisions for 3 weeks on board.

	09.14		Orders to Examination Officer:
			"Capture the ship, plan to use it as a supply ship."

			From further semaphore messages:
			The ship drives in charter of Standard Oil, New York, has cargo from English company to Australian company on board, 50 tons of drinking water and an evaporator for boiler feed water on board. From the ship a steamer was sighted also in the Sunda Strait an English steamer, 3 small warships and 1 aircraft. The tanker was stopped in the Sunda Strait by a Dutch auxiliary cruiser, Officer checked only the Papers. Diesel oil specific gravity is 0.91, flame point 84°C,


		I decide, to run out of the Sunda-Route with the tanker and then first fill my bunkers again.


			The Captain and 2 Officers were brought on board, the rest of the crew remained aboard for now

- 133 -



	continued
	07.10.40		Order to prize:
			"Make engines ready immediately, navigation fix 15°07'S 107°50'E, course 90°, speed 10 knots, meeting point about 16.00 hours 15°07'S 108°40'E. There ready to deliver oil over the stern. Ship 33 joins as did "NORDVARD". Move off as soon as engines are ready.

	11.10		After chronometer comparison and Radio Circuit orders moved off as ordered.

	20.00	Shortly before darkness towing connection was established, afterwards the oil hoses were given over. The ships lie across the wind again, as when delivering fuel to the prize "NORVARD". Ship 33 drifts with its high superstructure a bit faster and lies on the towline parallel to the tanker in the lee it established. Fuel was taken over during the night.

- 134 -




	08.10.40	15°02'S 108°22'E
	09.00	SEbyE 3-4, Sea 3, cloudy, Vis. good	Fueling finished.


		Ship 33 took over 1200 tons of diesel oil and so again the full bunker inventory of departure.
		My measure of supplying fuel to the prize "NORVARD" in the hope of being able to supply later, which initially appeared questionable, is now proving correct.
		During the night the ships steamed another 90 nm to the east to remain undisturbed.
		According to the cargo papers the tanker was destined for "Melbourne or other Australian ports".
		The Captain had not received any particular rules of conduct or course instructions.


		The Captain, Egil W i l h e l m s e n, and the 3rd Officer, Aage H a n s e n, from the Norwegian Motor ship "STORSTAD" said the following when questioned by the Prisoner Officer,

		The tanker ship "STORSTAD" is 8998 GRT, belonged to the Shipping Firm A.F. Klaveness & Co. in Oslo and was on the way from the harbor Miri and Sarawak (British Borneo) for the Australian harbor Melbourne, Adelaide and Port Pirie. The cargo consisted of 12481 tons of diesel oil. The ship was in the Charter of the "Standard Oil Company" New York. In the last two years the ship had driven in East Asiatic waters and a made a trip to the U.S.A. On 30 September it left Miri and was expected in Melbourne about on 20 October.
		In the Sunda Strait a total of 6 ships were met. Three small warships were seen, no details were given concerning the type and size. Two had stood under land, the third cruised in the Strait. At the east

	- 135 -




			side of the Strait they were stopped by a Dutch auxiliary cruiser (a small ship with auxiliary armament), the examination lasted about only 10 minutes. A Control Officer viewed the ship's papers from a boat which came alongside. After reviewing them, they were allowed to continue the journey. As a result, they only lost half an hour. A steamer could not be identified exactly, as it was already dark; a Polish steamer was suspected. An English passenger steamer was seen on a westerly course off the Sunda Strait. Additionally, they were circled in the Strait by an aircraft, a monoplane with floats, gray paint and with red triangles on the fuselage and wings.
			He had not heard about German auxiliary cruisers in the Indian Ocean. Some time ago there was talk of a German raider in the Tasman Sea.
			Before the trip, he received various papers and regulations, but he cannot remember exactly which one he received last. There had always been a great many regulations, and he had not studied them in detail on due to their abundance. The main instructions would always have come on board in Singapore, also in the Customs House and at the Console laid out the instructions, and each Captain could have taken them from the stack. Here he also received the wavelength information from the English stations for GBMS radio messages and a transcript from the Admiralty about the interference of radio communications by German auxiliary cruisers. He gave these instructions to the radio operator. They didn't have a key and didn't receive any encrypted telegrams.
			There were no warships in Hong Kong. Aircraft (land-based) were seen about 100 nm from the coast. Running lights were illuminated during the voyage except for the rear steamer light. At the time of the stopping he was in the bathroom and from the 3rd Officer who was on watch, only got the report after the first shot was fired. No papers were destroyed.

			The 3rd Officer and the Radio Officer said the following on questioning:

- 136 -



	continued
	08.10.40
		The ship had not been in Australia during the last two years. According to the written instructions that he received from the Captain, it was forbidden to transmit radio messages. Accordingly, there were no radio transmissions during the entire journey. He continued to ignore the GBMS wavelength setup and the Admiralty's instructions because they had no codes on board. Also they had not received an RRR- or QQQ-report so far, also the meaning of these groups was not known to him.
		Two years ago, a new shortwave transmitter and receiver were installed in the radio room.
		On the morning of the capture, he took over the watch at eight o'clock and immediately shot the sun. Then went into the chart room to calculate the altitude of the sun. Therefore he attached less importance to the lookout. When we came out around 08.30 hours he saw us and took us for a Wilhelmsen steamer. We didn't seem suspicious to him in any way, he just wondered about our course. Immediately afterwards the first warning shot was fired he immediately went to the engine telegraph and put it on "stop", then he ran to the Captain and reported. In the meantime the second shot had been fired. In the excitement he didn't see anything of the muzzle flash and he couldn't tell later where the gun could be.



		Since the ship appears particularly inconspicuous as a tanker, I considered using it as an auxiliary mine ship for the mining tasks I have planned.
		The subsequent inspection on board shows that in the aft superstructure deck, in which there are compartments and a passageway on both sides around the engine ducts, around 100 mines can be accommodated completely inconspicuously and camouflaged after all the equipment has been ripped out.
		I therefore order that the captured Norwegian tanker

- 137 -



	continued
	08.10.40	be converted into the German auxiliary mine ship "PASSAT".
		I appointed Leutnant zur See d.Res, W a r n i n g (Erich) as Kommandanten and designated him for the duration of these orders as a Sonderführer with the rank of Kapitänleutnant. He is given an appointment as Kommandant.
		Oberleutnant z.See L e v i t was ordered as Watch Officer.
		To look after the mines and prepare the deployment mechanism, Oberleutnant (W) S c h m i d t was ordered on board.
		As crew also came on board:
			1 Obermaschinst,
			8 Unteroffiziere,
			19 men of all career tracks
		There was sufficient fuel and water on board. The ship was provided with 6 weeks provisions. Reserve for 14 days.
		The auxiliary mine ship "PASSAT" was give the task of contaminating with mines
			a) the Bank Strait,
			b) the east entrance and
			c) the west entrance (Cape Otway) of the Bass Strait.
		Provided were:
			for a) 30 mines with clockwork delay, set for 48 hour delay,
			for b) 40 mines, of these 30 with clockwork delay 48 hours,
			for c) 40 mines.
		Therefore a total of 110 mines were on board to sow.
		After completion of the mine task rendezvous at a meeting point west of Australia at
			Square = JF 33
			Latitude = 31°30'S
			Longitude - 101°30'E
		is anticipated.
		Operations Order furnished.
		At the same time with "Ship 33" I intend to carry out the mine task at Sydney and Hobart.

- 138 -



	continued
	08.10.40
		In the evening the entire Norwegian crew was taken aboard and the ship was taken over by the German crew.











	09.10.40	14°55'S 108°59'E
		SE 2, Sea 1-2, clear, Vis. good


		During the night the interior fittings were completely torn from the aft superstructure deck, cabins and and mess. Cutting out by torch or moving individual iron walls, second baths, etc. was more difficult than expected and took longer. In the morning an attempt was made to transfer the first mine. similar to to torpedo delivery for UA, the rubber raft was used and a mine was placed on the raft using mats. The transfer succeeded, however, tilting the mine while hauling it over to the raft and lowering it onto the raft seemed extraordinarily tedious.

	Sun and Moon Data 08.10.40
	Sun and Moon Data 09.10.40

- 139 -

continued

09.10.40








Mine lying on the rubber raft.

Therefore the V-Boot was launched and an attempt was made to raise and lower a mine into the boat, which was well padded with mattresses and mats, despite the relatively still standing swell.

The attempt is successful and the V-Boot was now transferring mines one after the other.

	- 140 -

- 141 -



	continued
	09.10.40
		By nightfall 33 mines had been taken over. Overnight work continued on preparing the camouflaged mine rooms on the superstructure deck.


	10.10.40	Outfitting and equipping the "PASSAT" primarily the mine loading was continued at day break.
		In interrupted back and forth movements at 16.30 hours the 110 mines were taken over. The last mine was unloaded under flag decorations and with the following poem.

			The "STORSTAD" has her mines;
			We were busy like the bees
			The Sailor and the Mine Mixer;
			Both deserve praise.
			There is surely nothing to argue about.
			With "lower away!" and "hoist!" and breakfast bacon
			The last mine goes over.
			Now beloved Oberleutnant Schmidt,
			Don't bring back too many,
			For as many as possible should now
			do their part for Germany's power,
			announce to Tommy with splinters and cracks:
			"Germans can be found on all seas",
			Fighters who go for his throat
			and happily stand behind the Führer!
			In the Indian Ocean "PINGUIN" keeps faithful watch.
			Tommy watch out!

		Indian Ocean, 10 October 1940
			Author: Mtr.Gfr. Kehrein,
			Mtr.H.Gfr. Weber.

	Sun and Moon Data 09.10.40
	Sun and Moon Data 10.10.40

- 142 -



	continued
	10.10.40	However, some of the mines are still on the outer decks, since the preparation of the rooms in the superstructure has not yet been completed.
		Over night proceeded with "PASSAT" 90 nm on course 150°, because the ships have drifted in the vicinity of the steamer routes again.


	11.10.40	15°14'S 109°21'E
		SEbyS 3, Sea 2-3, cloudy, Vis. good

		The arrangements on the "PASAT" continue. Unfortunately the welding and torch work consume12 bottles of oxygen. By evening the 110 mines have disappeared from the outer decks. The camouflage is complete.
		"PASSAT" with 110 mines in the aft superstructure.

		Excellent work was done by the work details, especially the welders and carpenters, day and night. When the last working group leaves "PASSAT" at 18.00 hours, the

	Sun and Moon Data 10.10.40
	Sun and Moon Data 11.10.40

- 143 -



	continued
	11.10.40	England song is sung.
		"PASSAT" determines compass deviation. It turns out that the engine installation of the "PASSAT" is very neglected and ongoing repairs are necessary. In order not to have to reduce own technical staff even further, 6 heads of the Norwegian technical crew were used. Volunteered to take a cruise when asked; the 2nd and 3rd Engineer, the carpenter and 3 stokers; It was explained to them that they would be called upon to work over there in the installation, for which they would be paid, but that the danger was ultimately no greater than if they remained on the auxiliary cruiser.
		The Kommandant has orders to take the Norwegians into custody for the time of the mine deployment and to pay them before the mine-throwing begins. For this purpose he gets foreign currency in English currency.


	12.10.40
	00.30	15°18'S 109°14'E	"PASSAT" was released.
			"Ship 33" goes again on the Sunda Strait - Australia route, which gave us this fat morsel.

	Sun and Moon Data 11.10.40
	Sun and Moon Data 12.10.40

- 144 -



	continued
	12.10.40	14°39'S 107°47'E
	12.00	SEbyE 4, Sea 3, overcast, Vis. good	No particular events.
			Unfortunately, a hoped-for second steamer did not materialize on this route.

	13.10.40	14°02'S 107°38'E
	12.00	SEbyE 5, Sea 4, cloudy, Vis. good

			At 18.30 hours began the advance to the east coast of Australia for completion of the mine task at 13 knots, course 180°.


	14.10.40	17°30'S 107°30'E	)
	12.00	SEbyE 4, Sea 3-4, cloudy, Vis. good	)
		SEbyE 4, Sea 3-4, cloudy, Vis. good	)
			) No particular events.
			)
	15.10.40	22°13'S 107°32'E	)
	12.00	SEbyE 2-3, Sea 2, cloudy, Vis. good	)
		SEbyE 2-3, Sea 2, cloudy, Vis. good	)

	16.10.40	27°11'S 108°38'E	Received the message of appreciation on the award of the Iron Cross 1st Class to the Kommandant and another 50 of the crew the Iron Cross 2nd Class. I will keep 25 of the available Iron Cross 2nd Class until rendezvous with "PASSAT" in order to be able to award every man of the "PASSAT" crew after completing the task.
	12.00	SbyW 3, Sea 2, cloudy, Vis. good

	Sun and Moon Data 12.10.40
	Sun and Moon Data 13.10.40
	Sun and Moon Data 14.10.40
	Sun and Moon Data 15.10.40
	Sun and Moon Data 16.10.40

- 145 -




	17.10.40	32°04'S 109°54'E	On the trip so far the ship has covered 21600 nm = 1 time around the world in 124 days. In the evening each man had a glass of rum. (Motto: Once around!)
	12.00	SWbyS 2-3, Sea 2, overcast, Vis. good

	18.10.40	36°51'S 111°11'E	)
	12.00	WNW 2, Sea 1-2, overcast, Vis. good	)
		WNW 2, Sea 1-2, overcast, Vis. good	)
			)
			)
	MOZ 120° E	[GMT +8]	)
	=========		)
	19.10.40	39°19'S 116°57'E	)
	12.00	WNW 3-4, Sea 3, overcast, Vis. good	)
		WNW 3-4, Sea 3, overcast, Vis. good	) No particular events.
			)
			)
	20.10.40	41°31'S 123°25'E	)
	12.00	NbyW 4, Sea 3, overcast, Vis. medium	)


	21.10.40	43°22'S 130°16'E
	12.00	SWbyW 9-10, Sea 7, Vis. bad
			The expected heavy weather in this sea area is met. NW-storm. Over noon the crossing the front, wind jumped 90° to SW, in squalls strength 10, heavy stern sea.

	Sun and Moon Data 17.10.40
	Sun and Moon Data 18.10.40
	Sun and Moon Data 19.10.40
	Sun and Moon Data 20.10.40
	Sun and Moon Data 21.10.40

- 146 -



	continued
	21.10.40	I hope that "PASSAT", which is suspected to be on the same longitude but closer to the Australian coast, will have less high seas. His deck cargo of mines had to be lashed seaworthy without mine rails.
		Yesterday evening QQQ message from an Australian 2000-ton steamer in the east entrance of Bass Strait. Because "Ship 45" and "Ship 36" are still in the vicinity of the U-boat base, apparently a false report. Significant nervousness when repeating, serious keying errors, transmission of code groups without encryption, etc. Repeat of the QQQ-report by Melbourne, Adelaide and Sydney; last station gave Auto-alarm for all steamers. Steamer reports later, suspicious vessel passed out of sight.
		Of course, eight days before my planned mine operation with two ships, I very much regret this madness, which is pleasant in itself, and I hope that the false report will be recognized as such and that the excitement will have subsided by 28 October, without any significant effects on surveillance and patrol activity.

- 147 -




	22.10.40	44°42'S 137°22'E	)
	12.00	NWbyW 6, Sea 5, cloudy, Vis. good	)
		NWbyW 6, Sea 5, cloudy, Vis. good	)
			)
			)
	MOZ 135° E	[GMT +9]	)
	=========		)
	23.10.40	45°30'S 144°41'E	)
	12.00	WbyN 7, Sea 6-7, showers, squalls, Vis. good to bad	)
		WbyN 7, Sea 6-7, showers, squalls, Vis. good to bad	)
			)
			)
	24.10.40	43°51'S 151°38'E	)
	12.00	SW 6, Sea 6, clear, Vis. good	)
			)
			)
	MOZ 150° E	[GMT +10]	)
	=========		)
	25.10.40	41°51'S 154°52'E	)
		NW 4, Sea 3, cloudy, Vis. good	)
		NW 4, Sea 3, cloudy, Vis. good	)
			)
			)
	26.10.40	39°04'S 156°20'E	)
	12.00	NbyW 3, Sea 2, cloudy, Vis. good	)
		NbyW 3, Sea 2, cloudy, Vis. good	)
			)
			)
	27.10.40	35°16'S 157°32'E	)
	12.00	NWbyN 6-7, Sea 5-6, overcast, Vis. good	)
		NWbyN 6-7, Sea 5-6, overcast, Vis. good	)

	Sun and Moon Data 22.10.40
	Sun and Moon Data 23.10.40
	Sun and Moon Data 24.10.40
	Sun and Moon Data 25.10.40
	Sun and Moon Data 26.10.40
	Sun and Moon Data 27.10.40

- 148 -

28.10.40

32°48'S 153°31'E

12.00

S 4, overcast, Vis. good

The mine fouling on the Australian coast is to take effect suddenly in as many places as possible at the same time in 100-mine groups, using the two mine-laying vessels and the clockwork delay. Therefore, the following timing is provided for throwing:

	"PINGUIN"	"PASSAT"
28 October	Sydney - Newcastle	- / / -
	(48-hour delay)

29 October	- / / -	Bank Strait
		(48-hour delay)

30 October	- / / -	East entrance to the Bass Strait
		(48-hour delay)

31 October	Entrance to Hobart	West entrance Bass Strait

I also hope that this regulation will prevent the patrol vessels at the individual places from being alerted prematurely by the effects of mines at other locations.

The coast north of Sydney is approached on the steamer track with an unsuspicious southwesterly course.

I do not expect regular sea reconnaissance by air forces here after a war year in which nothing of essential importance has occurred. However, with the brisk aircraft activity on the coast during the day, as is detected in the radio picture, an encounter with aircraft can happen at any time. The upper deck must therefore be vacated in time, except for distributed soldiers in civilian clothes.

- 149 -



	continued
	28.10.40	I intend closing the coast and deploying mines as early as possible after the beginning of darkness, to have the greater part of the dark night available to run off, so that even an early aerial reconnaissance flight would find the ship far out at sea on an unsuspicious course.

	17.45		Set Action Stations.
			In accordance with the evening navigation fix came to the course line for the first deployment segment and then to course 244°, speed 15 knots.

	19.01	SSE 2-3, SSE Swell, very dark unclear night	After dark, 30° to starboard towards Newcastle, a glow sweeping left and right across the horizon comes into view. Initially it was taken as an airfield beacon, however turned out to be a searchlight, regularly searching back and forth to sea.

	19.33		The glow of Port Stephens beacon comes in sight 65° to starboard.

	19.40		In the direction of Sydney a slowly sweeping searchlight comes in sight. Illuminated for approximately 10 minutes.

	19.52		In the direction of Newcastle the glow of 3 searchlights is distinguished, in between the glow of the beacons of Newcastle. Cross bearings from Newcastle and Port Stephens could not be taken because the beacons are still below the horizon. The beacons burn as in peacetime.
			Despite the Sea State and Swell the port mine port was opened and the deployment platform was extended. The ingress of water is insignificant, as the ship only rolls and the stern is not much affected.

- 150 -



	continued
	28.10.40
	20.13	The first segment begins with the first mine in 188 meters of water. The deployment from aft posed no difficulties. The water ingress remains tolerable, ran off again through the scuppers.

	20.27	2 lights come in sight 30° to starboard. They were initially taken as steamer lights. Their bearing shifted astern and when

	20.50	to the right of them still further lights come in sight, they were recognized as lights on land (Catherine Hill, later red beacon).

	20.53	1st mine segment ended. Water depth at the last mine: 153 meters.

	21.09	The searchlights off Newcastle sweep over a shadow (bearing 312°T), shortly afterwards a cloud of smoke is made out in the searchlights a little starboard at this point.
		I associate the presence of a dimmed vessel so close to shore with the naval drills off Sydney and Newcastle announced by radio a few days ago.
		The shadow passes out of sight astern to starboard.

	21.19	Began deploying the 2nd segment.
		1st mine water depth: 140 meters.
		The positioning of the enemy searchlights guarding Sydney and Newcastle is now clearly visible. They are situated on hills, probably outside the city. Long range and strength. Search half-hourly 10 minutes long (in Sydney) or continually (Newcastle).

- 151 -



	continued
	28.10.40	They make direct approaches to objective [buoys] and harbor entrances more difficult and allow intruding vessels to be seen.

	21.39	2nd segment ended. Last mine water depth: 140 meters.

	21.55	Broke through the center of Norah Head's lighthouse.

	22.00	Came to course 270°, Norah Head directly ahead.

	22.20	Sydney - searchlights stay on.

	22.22	Began 3rd segment with the 1st mine in water depth: 130 meters. On this course the ship starts to pound. With more effect aft more water ingress.
		The position is clear: Norah Head Lighthouse directly ahead on a hill on land, Catherine Hill (much fainter) 30° to starboard (many lights) Newcastle searchlight abeam (shadows and smoke no longer seen), 20° to port the lights of a street or beach promenade from Upright Point. 30° to port the glow of the Barranjoey Head Lighthouse (Broken Bay) and the searchlights from Sydney 60° to port.

	22.38	The lights of a vessel come in sight 35° to port (323°R), was taken as a fisherman or coastal vessel. The deployment of the 9th mine was accelerated, the last mine went in depth 96 meters in a turn to the run off course 150°.

		On the new course the ship went against the SSE Swell and seas. It pounds heavily and through the stern port with the stern sea

- 152 -



	continued
	28.10.40	affect on the ship much water comes in. The intended protection for the deployment teams has proven its worth.

	23.30	To deploy the last barrier came to 14 knots, to quiet the pounding and effect on the ship.

	23.39	Because too much water comes in, went to 13 knots.

	23.40	Began the 4th segment (objective Sydney) with the first mine in water depth 148 meters. At times the port is halfway closed, the mine deployment team is up to their waist in water. Despite this, the deployment goes smoothly. However, the water no longer runs off sufficiently, it mostly flows out of the deployment room into the ship forward into mine rooms III and II. Here the water is approx. 30 cm high from and rushes side to side through the room with great force as [the ship] rolls violently.

	29.10.40
	00.01	The 4th segment ended with the last mine in 164 meters of water. Course 110°, 10 knots to retract the port.

	00.35	Port closed. Luckily the retraction went unusually quickly.

	00.40	Ran off at 15 knots, course 110°.

	01.00	Secured from Combat Watch.

	03.30	Glow from the Newcastle searchlight out of sight.

	Sun and Moon Data 28.10.40
	Sun and Moon Data 29.10.40

- 153 -



	continued
	29.10.40	Ran to the south at 15 knots to finish Mine Task II off Hobart.
		Because heavy weather is to be expected with mine deployment off the south cost of Tasmania, after yesterday's first experiences with the water penetrating through the mine port, appropriate precautions will be taken. The elbows of the overflow pipes of the aft ammunition chambers in the shaft tunnel are opened, the aft peak emptied and its manhole covers opened and the ship is given a fore trim, so that the mine port has more freeboard.
		Because up to 24.00 hours nothing is heard from "PASSAT", I accept that he has carried out Task I today, fouling the Bank Strait, as planned.

	30.10.40	40°20'S 151°58'E	No particular events.
	12.00	SbyW 3, Sea 2, cloudy, Vis. good
		Even today, "PASSAT" was not heard from. Therefore Task II, fouling of the east entrance of the Bass Strait, was carried out as planned.

	31.10.40	44°19'S 147°59'E
	12.00	NE 5-6, Sea 5, misty, rain, Vis. bad

		With the bad weather, I decide to head for the uninhabited rock Pedra Blanca early in the afternoon, since aerial reconnaissance is not to be expected.
		I very much hope that the unsightly weather will last until the mine-deployment. However, the weather forecaster promises passage of the front with clear visibility.

	Sun and Moon Data 29.10.40
	Sun and Moon Data 30.10.40
	Sun and Moon Data 31.10.40

- 154 -



	continued
	31.10.40
	15.44	Overcast, foggy, drizzle, Vis. bad	"Pedra Blanca" and "Eddystone Rock" in sight ahead to starboard. Closed at low speed, in order to advance from this exact position, 15 nm off the entrance to the D'Entrecasteaux Channel, in the evening to complete the mine task.

	17.05		The sky was suddenly clear, the rain has stopped and ahead to starboard the snow-covered peaks of the Tasmanian coast mountains, up to 1000 meters high, come into view. Turned away and ran off unto out of visual range. Before darkness came to 335° again and headed for the two rocks.

	19.00		Manned Combat Stations.
			Lighthouse at Cape Bruny comes in sight 40° to starboard.

	19.37		"Pedra Blanca" abeam to starboard 2 1/2 nm. Because in the meantime it has completely cleared and is a starry clear night, the horizon in the west is still sharp enough to see, slowed to 10 knots.

	20.00		Cape Bruny taken directly ahead in 23°T.

	20.07		The shine of a searchlight sweeping back and forth across the horizon comes into view in 9°T.

	20.21		Another searchlight sighted in 24°T, apparently it is a searchlight, that are situated on both sides of the D'Entrecasteaux Channel at the strait behind Bruny Island.

- 155 -



	continued
	31.10.40
	20.29	The port was opened and the deployment platform extended. There is only a light Swell, no water comes into the ship.

	20.47	Cloudiness is increasing, the horizon was darker, increased speed to 13 knots and soon thereafter to 15 knots.

	20.59	"Tasman Island" Lighthouse in sight to starboard.

	21.00	Patrol vessel radio bearing in 347°T. It must be further inside the D'Entrecasteaux Channel. The ship is now close enough to the entrance to get the exact location. Abeam to port 6 nm away the 300 meter high coastal mountains extend far ahead. Ahead the entrance with the continually shining searchlights and ahead to starboard Bruny Island. Any vessel cannot be made out by land as the sea and mountains form a black darkness. An incredibly impressive sight that offers itself to the ship.

	21.05	Came to deployment course 45°.

	21.18	Patrol vessel radio bearing in 30°T, apparently in Storm Bay.

	21.20	Began the 1st deployment segment. 1st mine water depth: 100 meters.

	21.26	Came to course 94°.

	21.35	Ended the 1st deployment section, last mine water depth: 97.5 meters.

- 156 -



	continued
	31.10.40		Moved off at 16 knots into Storm Bay.

	21.53		Tasman Head 5 nm abeam.

	22.09		Abeam to port a searchlight becomes visible behind Tasman Head, apparently in a corner of Storm Bay.

	22.29		Turned to course 36° deployment course for the 2nd barrier.
			2 searchlights are now seen in 350°T, apparently directly at the Hobart entrance.

	22.35		A light on land comes in sight in 347°T and 344°T.

	23.00		The first mine of the 2nd deployment section is deployed in 113 meters of water.


	01.11.40
	00.07		Came to course 101°.

	00.30		The last mine is deployed in 137 meters of water. Deployment segment ended. 6 nm abeam to port lies the high coast of Tasman Island with the lighthouse. There are now no lights or other signs of settlement on land. Came to course 200°, ran off at 15 knots.

	01.11.40	44°40'S 146°42'E
	12.00	WbyN 9-10, storm, Sea 8, rain, Vis. bad

	Sun and Moon Data 31.10.40
	Sun and Moon Data 01.11.40

	- 156 a-

	- 156 b -

- 157 -



	continued
	01.11.40	There are no reports from "PASSAT". So it was able to complete its task III, the western entrance to Bass Street, today without any problems. Unfortunately, towards the morning, heavy weather is coming from the northwest, so eventually we had to abandon our southerly course and turn to the west, and later to a northwesterly course.
		For the first time, the ship has to fight against very high, heavy seas. The camouflage of the 7.5 cm stopping gun on the forecastle is destroyed.
		Haven't heard anything yet from "PASSAT", which certainly had to deal with the bad weather on its way out.

	02.11.40	44°09'S 144°40'E
		Storm SWbyW 8, Sea 7, rain, misty, Vis. bad

		The bad weather continues. We are not making any progress. My intention is to try to lay mines off the Spencer Gulf if everything remains calm until then and the coast is not alarmed by any mining successes. However, if the loss of time due to bad weather increases, the nights with the waxing moon will be too bright for such an operation.

	03.11.40	43°48.5'S 142°00'E
	02.00	WNW 6-7, Sea 5-6, overcast, rain, Vis. unclear	Report from "PASSAT" that all tasks were completed as planned. Great!
			The weather has still not improved. The ship works heavily.

	04.11.40	42°45'S 137°08'E
	12.00	SW 5-6, Sea 5, cloudy, Vis. good

	Sun and Moon Data 01.11.40
	Sun and Moon Data 02.11.40
	Sun and Moon Data 03.11.40
	Sun and Moon Data 04.11.40

- 158 -



	continued
	04.11.40	Slow weather improvement. Speed can be increased. I will still try to complete the Spencer Gulf task



	MOZ 135°E	[GMT +9]
	=========
	05.11.40	38°44'S 131°34'E
	12.00	NNE 3, Sea 2, cloudy, Vis. good

		Good weather. Tried to made to make up some of the lost time by traveling at full speed, particularly since a new fuel supply from "PASSAT" is likely. I hope to be able to deploy the mines tomorrow evening, despite the quarter-moon.
		Shortly before dark, two masts, apparently from a tanker, come into sight under the horizon, heading for Melbourne. As we approached to make further observations, he turned away. He is "playing along". As darkness is now rapidly approaching, it is doubtful the steamer will be found if she changes course again, and there is still a possibility that she will radio when approached, having already turned away when in sight, I decide not to try again to find the steamer in the interests of tomorrow's mine-laying mission. This decision, which I did not make with great joy, is made easier by the possibility that the steamer could run into one of the "PASSAT" mines in the entrance to Bass Strait.

	Sun and Moon Data 04.11.40
	Sun and Moon Data 05.11.40

- 159 -




	06.11.40	35°20'S 133°29'E
	14.45	Changing wind 1-3, overcast, showers, thunder clouds, rain, Vis. worse	A steamer came into sight under land in 0°T on the easterly approach course, 3 masts, bridge visible.

	15.00		Because I want to remain unseen immediately before the mine task, turned away to course 180° and ran until out of sight.

	15.17		Steamer out of sight, turned to course 90° and stopped, to begin the advance from here towards evening.

	17.00		Course 88°, 8 knots.

	18.00		15 knots.

	21.15		Glow of "South Neptunes" lighthouse in sight.

	21.35		Glow of "Cape Borda" Lighthouse Kangaroo Island in sight. Completely calm sea, overcast, however bright night from the moon, however low visibility, misty horizon, at the beginning the moon broke through sometimes, then however, the clouds closed up completely.

	22.30		Came to course 104° to the start point of the deployment courses.

	22.47		The front course of "South Neptunes" in sight, came to mine deployment course 134°.

	23.03		The 1st mine went in depth 118 meters.

- 160 -



	continued
	06.11.42
	23.16		Section I. ended.

	23.20		Came to new deployment course 162°. No water entry aft.

	23.28		1st mine Section II, depth 125 meters.
			After moonset now very low visibility weather, overcast, misty, horizon is barely recognizable, however the beacons are easily recognized.

	23.45		Section II ended.

	23.49		Came to new course 138°.

	23.59		1st mine Section III. Deployment section depth 132 meters.

	07.11.40
	00.16		Section III ended. The deployment platform is retracted, the gate is closed.

			No vessels or searchlights were observed here. Radio traffic from individual patrol vessels was heard and tracked further inside. At around 23.30 hours they ended their radio traffic and wished us "good night".

	00.20		Ran off on course 250° at 15 knots.

	05.00		In the course of the morning aircraft radio traffic was observed repeatedly.

	12.00	36°39'S 132°31'E	Ran off at top speed until midday, then headed west at 9 knots on the Melbourne - SW corner of Australia track, on which the tanker was recently encountered.
		WNW 5-6, Sea 4-5, misty, Vis. medium

	Sun and Moon Data 06.11.40
	Sun and Moon Data 07.11.40

- 161 -



	continued
	07.11.40
		In intend to wait on the radio report concerning the completed mining because of the likelihood that the radio message will get through is greater if the ship is clear of the Australian continent. Since the longer radio message to be transmitted invites direction-finding, setting off further seems appropriate.







	08.11.40	37°08'S 129°28'E
	12.00	SW 6-7, Sea 5, overcast, misty, Vis. poor

		The first successes of the mines of the Bass Strait was heard on the Australian transmitter.
		According to this, on the evening of 7 November, an English freighter ran aground just below Promontory Point and sank. The crew drifted in the lifeboats for nine hours and were then picked up by minesweepers and patrol boats. One man is missing. On the evening of November 8th, the American motor ship "CITY OF RAYVILLE" (5833 tons) ran aground in the western entrance close to Cape Otway and sank 1.5 hours later. The crew landed in lifeboats, but one man is missing.

	Sun and Moon Data 07.11.40
	Sun and Moon Data 08.11.40

- 162 -



	continued
	08.11.40	These ship losses, as can be seen from the time groups of the radio messages in question, obviously caused a great deal of nervousness among the Australian naval authorities. They were communicated in code to all British merchant ships, and a general warning was issued to shipping about endangered areas within a radius of 30 nautical miles around Cape Otway and Promontory Point.
		This endangered area, which is being warned about, does not even come close to encompassing the fouling reported in both locations.
		9 minutes after the general warning against sailing in the area around Promontory Point, the order was issued to close the entire Bass Strait and Port Philippe to all shipping until further notice. Ships destined for Melbourne are to call at the nearest suitable port.
		A hardly hoped-for success of the mine fouling in two places.
		Since it is unlikely to encounter any steamers on the route to Melbourne after these events, course was changed to the great circle Adelaide - Cape Town to continue the transit westward.
		There is a heavy counter swell.







	MOZ 120°E	[GMT +8]
	========
	09.11.40	37°32'S 127°21'E
		WbyS 2-3. Sea 2, overcast, misty, Vis. medium

		From the radio news broadcasts of the Australian transmitter

	Sun and Moon Data 08.11.40
	Sun and Moon Data 09.11.40

- 163 -



	continued
	09.11.40	and from radio presses the following details are taken:

		Excerpt of the "Australian Press" of 9 November:
		A second ship was lost due to an explosion on the Australian coast. Shortly after the mishap of the British freighter the American motor ship "CITY OF RAYVILLE" 5800 tons flew into the air and sank this morning off Cape Otway. The crew of 38 men were rescued by fishing boats, one man was lost.

		Excerpt of the "Manila Press" of 9 November:
		Melbourne: Today the Australian government ordered that the Bass Strait be closed to all ship traffic after two ships were sunk, the American steamer "CITY OF RAYVILLE" and an unnamed Englander with the loss of one crew member each. Within 24-hours both steamers sank on the Australian coast, after both had probably ran on mines. The Bass Strait is the sea area between Tasmania and Victoria.

		Broadcast of the Adelaide, Melbourne, Sydney radio stations of 9 November 1745 ZZ:
		The first American steamer lost to enemy action in this war, is the "CITY OF RAYVILLE". This overseas steamship ran on a mine on its way to Australia on the Australian coast and sank. Subsequently survivors report:
		Captain Cronin had already been torpedoed in the World War and had to get into a lifeboat in the ocean. He was in the bridge house. At 11 minutes to eight o'clock in the evening a terrible explosion occurred, a column of water up to 100 feet high towered over the ship and everything on the upper deck was destroyed and the deck cargo, wood, flew far and wide. Everything was destroyed and it took until 8:23 hours in the morning for the crew to disembark in a lifeboat. Twice more crew members jumped into the sea from the sinking steamer and the boat went back

- 164 -



	continued
	09.11.40	to pick them up and then finally set off. It was "pitch black" and only the light of the beacons of Cape Otway were seen. The steamer sank quickly and the water penetrated quickly through the hatches into the ship, because in the explosion the hatch covers were thrown up in the air up to 50 feet high. At 09.31 hours the steamer disappeared into the deep. The survivors were taken over out of the lifeboats by fishing boats, which were in the vicinity on their way home from fishing. The steamer was 7 miles from land at the time of the explosion and despite the darkness, 38 of the 39 crew members were rescued.
		The radioman was in the radio room at the explosion. Half of the bridge collapsed and the flying deck cargo damaged the room and the equipment so much that he could no longer transmit and ran straight out onto the bridge. He was from the New York area and they were last there on 29 August and where the ship came from or where it was headed were not stated.

		Excerpt of the Australian News of 9 November, 18.15 ZZ:
		First, two overseas ships were sunk on the Australian coast. Both in Bass Strait. One English and one American steamer. The first American in this war. The Germans will have to answer to the American government for this breach of neutrality. The sinking of these two ships occurred on the 26th anniversary of the destruction of the German raider "EMDEN" by an Australian cruiser, "SYDNEY". The American steamer "CITY OF RAYVILLE" ran on a mine 7 nm from Cape Otway. From the English steamer the rescued people drifted for over 9 hours in the worst weather on the open sea until they were picked up by minesweepers. Today minesweepers have put to sea and aircraft have taken off to search the incident sites for survivors and mines. One man from each crew is missing. These sad shipping losses occurred in Bass Strait within 24 hours.
		Incidentally, complete silence was maintained about the sunken British freighter.

- 165 -




	10.11.40	38°17'S 123°39'E	Continued high swell.
	12.00	W 7-8, Sea 6-7, cloudy, Vis. good

		After leaving the bad weather area I intend to begin the necessary overhaul of the main engines. During this period the ship will have only one operable engine, highest speed 11 knots.
		After meeting with "PASSAT" first fuel oil supply is planned, then operation together - covering a larger sea area - come in question or further mine tasks for "PASSAT". This depends primarily on the condition of "PASSAT's" engines.
		A previously planned transfer of this fuel source to Ship 36 is likely to be canceled due to the modified operational plan of this ship, since instead of the previously planned homeward-bound operation through the Indian Ocean, it will now remain in the South Seas for the time being in order to operate there together with Ship 45.

		Skl. reports the sinking of the American steamer "CITY OF RAYVILLE" and congratulates Ship 33 on the success. I gather from this that the further, very serious consequences of the ship's mining activities have not yet become known to the Skl., although the closure of Bass Strait and the loss of two steamers have been announced in the Japanese and Manila press.

		Excerpt of the Australian News of 10 November, 07.00 ZZ:
		The Australian Navy Minister Melbourne announced that naval units were deployed to remove the minefield, as well as aircraft that would simultaneously search for the raider that was probably nearby. Several mines have already been cleared and removed, and barriers have been identified. With these losses, Australia has lost 4 ships in this war, while hundreds of thousands have left and

- 166 -

continued

10.11.40

arrived during the war.

11.11.40

38°47'S 120°00'E

12.00

SWbyS 4-5, Sea 4, cloudy, Vis. good

Weather was gradually better. Could run at higher speed, to gain ground to the west.

At 21.40 hours two Radio Messages were sent to Skl. concerning the executed fouling. Position: about 250 nm south of the SW corner of Australia:

1st Radio Message:
	Fouling completed: Sea area "Sydney-Newcastle" between 33° and 33°35'S. Bass Strait north of "Kent Group" between 147°50'E and 146°10'E (one Brit) and from north of "King Island" to 142°35'E (one American).

2nd Radio Message:
	"Banks Strait", "Hobart". "Stormbay" and "D'Entrecasteaux Channel". "Spencer Gulf" southwest quadrant "South Neptunes: radius 27 nm, 70 mines remaining. Fuel filled completely.

We will continue to sail at high speed to the west in order to change our position as quickly as possible in case bearings were taken on the ship on the 18- meter wavelength when we radio.

12.11.40

39°51'S 113°43'E

12.00

WbyS 2, cloudy, Vis. good

	Sun and Moon Data 10.11.40
	Sun and Moon Data 11.11.40
	Sun and Moon Data 12.11.40

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	continued
	12.11.40	The Australian Naval Authority announced by radio that on 14 November the Bass Strait can be sailed again. However, all ships have to ask for the approved route in advance in an Australian port. This obligation remains in effect after the 6-day complete closure of the Bass Strait.



		Excerpt of the Japan Press of 12 November, 00.30 ZZ:
		Experts have examined the metal fragments, which were thought to be parts of a mine and found in the lifeboats of the American freighter "CITY OF RAYVILLE". The freighter sank yesterday as a result of an explosion 120 nm from Melbourne. Captain Cronin said the metal parts were not from the ship. Meanwhile, minesweepers have lined up the Bass Strait, where the explosion took place, to search for further mines. The mines tentatively found in Bass Strait are believed to have been laid by a German submarine, as a surface ship would have difficulty escaping searches s in Australian waters. The second officer, Mr. Green, described the explosion and said: "It was a deafening explosion without any warning." Mr. Green said: "The ship sank incredibly quickly forward up to the bridge." "CITY OF RAYVILLE" was the first American ship sunk in the current war. The freighter was lost at one of the farthest points from America touched by American shipping.



		Excerpt of the Australian Midday News of 12 November 1940:
		According to a report from Melbourne, the minesweepers have carried out their search despite the stormy weather, which greatly hampered mine detection,

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	continued
	12.11.40	and cleared a total of 7 mines. It has not yet been established whether the mines are of German or Italian origin, as they do not appear to have any markings. It can be expected that in a few days the Bass Strait will be reopened to shipping. The selected and numerous coastal defense and mine sweeping units mean that Australia can guarantee America that there is nothing more to fear for its shipping.




		In the evening, confirmation of the fouling report was received from Skl. The report about Bank Strait, Hobart-Stormbay and D'Entrecasteaux Channel was not understood by Norddeich. Skl. only expects additional reports if further fouling occurs north of the sea area near Sidney and west of Spencer Gulf. So this is not necessary.
		I'm all the more concerned about this lack of clarity in the radio message, as I was trying to define the location of the fouled areas as narrowly and clearly as possible, in order to give another mine carrier the opportunity to subsequently carry out further fouling if necessary.
		According to the Skl.'s opinion, now expressed in the unclear radio message, the entire Australian coastal area from Newcastle through Tasmania to Spencer Gulf is no longer an option for mining operations by another auxiliary cruiser.
		Since further radio communication is no longer an option, I leave the western course and head for the agreed meeting point with "PASSAT".

- 169 -




	MOZ 105°E	[GMT +7]
	========
	13.11.40	36°44'S 108°21'E
	12.00	NE 1-2, Sea 1, overcast, clear, Vis. good
			Began the engine overhaul in the evening.



		The engines have run without an overhaul since the commissioning of the ship in February 1940, since putting to see on 15 June 1940 continuously.
		In addition to removing and cleaning all valves, exhaust lines and mufflers, the pistons must be pulled out of each cylinder and cleaned. In order to limit the time of the second engine is out of service to a minimum, using a spare piston, the piston of a cylinder is pulled in one night and replaced by a piston that has been overhauled, so that the second engine is ready to run again during the day.
		Several work groups were are put together for day and night work. The mechanical personnel were supplemented by aircraft and mine mechanics as well as individual seamanship personnel. The rolling ship must be positioned into the swell while the pistons are being pulled and installed.


		Excerpt of the ABC Radio Midday News of 13 November 1940:
		It was announced from Melbourne that in the future a permanent patrol service will be set up along the coast.
		After several mines found by minesweepers were examined, it is now clear that the mines are of German origin. Mine-sweeping is progressing further every day and none of the mines that have yet to be cleared will be of any use to the enemy.

		Reuters Copyright-Press s of 13 November 1940:
		Melbourne: It is now known for certain, and

- 170 -



	continued
	13.11.40	confirmed by the Minister of the Navy, that a German raider recently laid the mines which caused the loss of a British and an American merchant ship. The raider must still be within a certain radius, and naval and air reconnaissance aircraft are searching diligently for it.

	14.11.40	33°47'S 104°13'E
	12.00	NEbyN 1, Sea 0-1, cloudy, clear, Vis. good
			Radio Message concerning "Special recognition by Skl. for excellently carried out fouling operation.

		Excerpt of the ABC Radio Midday News of 14 November 1940:
		As of today, the Bass Strait is free for shipping, after the enemy mines were cleared by mine search formations. The Bass Strait is of particular importance as an access route to the South Australian ports, since Australia, as a port of call of Great Britain, exports its goods to the homeland from here. Equally important is the port of Hobart with its large grain storage facilities. Of course, such important waters were protected from the beginning of the war by a large-scale patrol service by the Navy and Air Force. This protection has been significantly strengthened. Apparently a German raider managed to pass the Strait. Air units are searching for it.

	Sun and Moon Data 13.11.40
	Sun and Moon Data 14.11.40

- 171 -




	15.11.40
	06.20	A smoke cloud in sight ahead to port; was identified as "PASSAT".

	08.00	The two ships passed, crews lined up in passing formation. "3 Hurrays". The joy of this reunion after 33 days (ship 33!) separation and after both ships have completed their mine-laying mission close to the enemy coast is universal and an adventure for the entire crew

- 172 -



	continued
	15.11.40	31°28'S 101°31'E
	12.00	SE 1, Sea 0, cloudy, clear, Vis. good	"PASSAT" Kommandant comes on board to report.
			"PASSAT" Kriegstagebuch, deployment sketches and track chart are at hand.
			In the afternoon "PINGUIN" lay on a towline at the stern of the tanker. Until night 810 tons of diesel fuel were taken over.


		Without the fuel supply from "STORSTAD" for their use and the probability of the new supply possibility from "PASSAT" I would have had to put much more time for the mining operation around the Australian coast at economical speed (9 knots).
		In order to consider the further use of "PASSAT", one first has to determine our own time allocation.
		I'm expect to receive instructions from the Skl. regarding the operation in the Antarctic planned for December/January 1941, at least a partition of the catching areas in case - as we have planned so far - more commerce raiders go to the Antarctic.
		If I don't receive any further instructions, I intend to advance southwards into the Kerguelen area and search the catching areas from east to west. The advance should take place in the first half of December at the latest, as long transits must be carried out economically despite fuel replenishment.
		Until then - about 3 weeks - the engine overhaul is the important thing for "PINGUIN".
		To the extent compatible with this, will also try to wage cruiser war west of Australia at this time (highest speed with one engine with good weather 10.5 knots. There is already heavy marine growth). How can "PASSAT" be used further for warfare?

- 173 -

continued

15.11.40

The Kommandant and the leading Machinist evaluate the condition of the ship and above all the engine installation as very bad. It is an old ship and is no longer suitable for long transits in bad weather. According to the judgment of the Ob.Masch, all parts of the engines are in great need of overhaul, the ship should be in due shipyard shortly, main engines show strong cracks in the foundations, which work hard in the sea.

The following use possibilities could be considered:

		A)	New mining operation.
			1)	In the period until beginning of the advance into the Antarctic.
			2)	For the duration of the absence "PINGUIN" in Antarctica.
The very well camouflaged mine accommodation, which was created with a lot of effort, as well as the ability to be converted into a tanker suggest that the ship could be used again for a mine clearance task.
To A)			1)	In the remaining time until departure to the south, only one mine task on the near west coast of Australia can come into question (Perth, Albany, Geraldton).
				However, after the recent war events, I consider the chances of success for effective fouling with increased alertness to be very low and I see greater potential for effectiveness in using the remaining mines on this part of the Australian coast at a later date. Unrest and insecurity in the Australian shipping sector has already increased.
To A)			2)	A long-term use of the auxiliary mine ship (mine operation on the west coast of India, as long as "PENGUIN" is in the south) is not considered possible with the condition of ship and engine.

	B)	Take the tanker with the valuable fuel to the Antarctic.
				It is thought of the possibility of the need to give fuel to whaling mother ship to get it to the homeland. This idea must also be abandoned for the foreseeable future.

- 174 -

continued

15.11.40

C)	Alternative use until advance to the south.
		Therefore I intend to operate jointly with the tanker until further notice, i.e. to position it or have it move in such a way that a sea area of 70 nautical miles can be overseen by both ships.

16.11.40

31°02'S 101°27'E

12.00

SE 4-5, overcast, Vis. good

Auxiliary mining ship "PASSAT" was decommissioned and redesignated as the prize ship "STORSTAD". The crew was reduced to a prize crew of 18 men, The Norwegian crew is increased to 20 heads. The rest of the Norwegian crew including the Captain remain aboard "PINGUIN".

The leader of the "Prize" was the already transferred Watch Officer on board Oberleutnant z.See Levit, as well as Lookout Officer Oberleutnant (W) Schmidt and a Feldwebel. (senior non-Commissioned Officer)

	Sun and Moon Data 15.11.40
	Sun and Moon Data 16.11.40

- 175 -



	continued
	16.11.40		For communications a Hagenuk device was given on board, with which telephone calls can be made up to a distance of 100 nm after fixed signal letter groups are called on Shortwave.
	18.00		"STORSTAD" was released to take up an eastern patrol position, since "PENGUIN" is not maneuverable tonight to inspect the fuel filter.



	17.11.40	30°54'S 101°22'E	The engine overhaul is making good progress as planned, and the individual permanent work groups have settled in well.
	12.00	SEbyE 4-5, Sea 3-4, overcast, Vis. good
			A square chart has been prepared for the joint operation, which makes it much easier to navigate the two ships. I intend to be at about 30°S moving back and forth on an E-W course, with "STORSTAD" to the north.
	19.00		Shortly before darkness smoke cloud in sight abeam to starboard.
			Turned towards on course 190° at HF.
			Only one engine is ready, the other is currently being prepared to remove a piston; fortunately the cylinder itself has not yet been taken apart, so that the engine can be operable in an hour.
	19.28		Came to course 241° - suspected course to follow.

	Sun and Moon Data 16.11.40
	Sun and Moon Data 17.11.40

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	continued
	17.11.40
	19.57	From the foremast a smokestack can be seen for a short time. Every 10 minutes a thick cloud of smoke comes out. The bearing is slowly shifting to starboard.
		After sunset, darkness quickly descended, making it almost impossible to make out the smokestack and the plume of smoke on the increasingly blurred and darkening horizon.
		The following situation is assumed:
		According to the few, somewhat inaccurate, bearings, the steamer is heading on a westerly course (South coast of Australia - Cape Leeuwin - to South Africa). So it is a loaded steamer.
		Estimated range 22 nm.
	20.40	I decide to turn southwest into the steamer's presumed course and - once the second engine is ready - to run up behind it.

	22.25	Came to course 270° - the assumed course of the steamer - and came to 13 knots.
		Despite the full moon due to the thick clouds the visibility is bad.


	18.11.40
	00.03	Came 5° to starboard - rising faintly from the dark horizon - a cloud of smoke in sight.

	Sun and Moon Data 17.11.40
	Sun and Moon Data 18.11.40

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	continued
	18.11.40	The assumed situation has been found to be correct.
		Moved off a bit to have a clear view free of smoke and gun smoke in wind lee. I expect that the alertness of the steamer is bad aft.

	00.30	Came to 14 knots and shortly thereafter 15 knots - full speed.
		Came to a pursuit course again, so that ship's bearing is steady.

	01.42	Bearing approximately 255°T, 8 nm away. The overcast was lighter and finally breaks up, the full moon is seen now and then, then I'm in an unfavorable position astern.
		The smokestack and masts of the steamer are recognized.

	01.58	1st and 6th cannon, bow gun , radar and searchlight were exposed.

	02.21	Bearing 243°T, 5800 meters.
		Large, long ship, estimated at 7000 tons, piston ship with a crew of about 70 men.

	02.37	Bearing 236°T, range 4300 meters.
		Steamer suddenly turns away 20°, was now stopped:

	02.39	One shot before the bow. Morse call:
		"A - A - A - Stop - A - A - A - Stop -"

	02.41	Shows he finally got it and sends:

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	continued
	18.11.40
	02.41	"British ship "NOWSHERA"."

	02.43	Morse traffic:
		"Do not use wireless, stop!"
		He sends "Understood".

	02.47	Searchlight illuminates briefly:
		Black steamer with yellow superstructure, cannon on the stern, has still not stopped.

	02.48	One again shot before the bow and Morse traffic:
		"Stop".
		He answers: "I am stopping now".

	02.50	Morse traffic:
		"I send a boat". Understood.
		The steamer stops and remains astern.

	03.00	Morse traffic:
		"Where are you bound for?"
	03.05	Answer:
		" . . . . . . England".

	03.06	Searchlight illuminates:
		On the poop deck near the gun, people are running around each other; the gun seems to be aimed at us.

	03.06	Permission to open fire for the Torpedo Officer and turned away to shoot: then I suddenly see, faintly outlined against the black horizon, the long black barrel of the gun, which is in the lashed position.

	03.06	Torpedo armament halt!
		A flashing brass wheel was mistaken for the gun muzzle aimed at us.

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	continued
	18.11.40
	03.06	The men leave the gun as the searchlight continues to focus on them.

	03.11	Morse traffic:
		"Wait for my Examination Officer". Understood.
		Stopped off his bow, so that he can't shoot, and a boat can be launched.

	03.19	Morse traffic:
		"My boat is coming now!"
		The boat sets off. It has been agreed with the Examination Officer: In case of danger, red star, the steamer will then be torpedoed immediately (we will use a green star).

	03.29	Prize crew goes on board. The situation is still unclear. I believe its possible that the Englander thinks we are an English auxiliary ship and on recognizing the prize crew will open fire. In this case I will immediately torpedo the steamer without regard to my own prize crew, since, according to previous experience, there is still enough time to get into the boats when the torpedo is fired.

	03.31	Morse traffic from Examination Officer:
		"From Adelaide for Durban, zinc and wool".
		The steamer is under our control. Unfortunately the secret papers are destroyed. The cannon and radio room were occupied. Initially the 15 Europeans of the crew were sent on board. The remaining, unfortunately a very large crew, consist of Indians. I intend, to bring over all provisions and mail found on board in the course of the day,

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	continued
	18.11.40		before I sink the steamer. The Prize Officer comes back with the Europeans and states:

		Steamer "NOWSHERA" of the shipping company British India Line, Glasgow, built 1919, 7920 GRT, 11 knot transit speed, 13.5 knots highest speed. 113-man crew, of these 20 whites, (1 passenger). On 10 November from Adelaide with 3000 tons wheat, 4000 tons ore, 2000 tons wool. The 2nd Officer was on the morning watch and had first sighted ["PENGUIN"] when the stopping shot was fired. He had destroyed all of the papers. The 3rd Officer had 6 men man the cannon. Among the crew was one soldier of the British Navy. The gun was Japanese 4.7" long barrel gun and installed in Calcutta.



		The anti-aircraft protection consisted of an old machine gun on the bridge.

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	continued
	18.11.40	The crew was alarmed by a long tone on the steamer whistle. The Captain gave the order, to abandon the cannon, when the searchlight was directed. The steamer was expected in Durban on 1/2 December, from where it was to go to England. It left Adelaide with deployed otters.



		He heard of the mine fouling only from the news reported in the Australian newspapers. A Japanese steamer was sighted at Cape Lune. It has been cruising in India for 4 years, came from Madras at the end of September and is now making its first trip to England. The ship was prepared in Australia for a trip to England. Splinter protection towers have been set up in the bridge wing, the chart house is roughly clad with armored walls. The radio cabin and engine skylight are protected by sandbags.

	- 182 -



		continued
		18.11.40

- 183 -



	continued
	18.11.40

		A bastion made of sandbags has been built at the gun. The steering motor has been converted into a back-up steering position and is also protected. The steamer has a bow spier and four otters as mine protection. It is a two-propeller coal ship. Coal consumption 70 tons at 11 knots, 100 tons at 13 knots. It has mail to South Africa and England on board.
		In the course of the morning, in order to reduce boat traffic and avoid constant maneuvering, the tried and tested bow-to-stern drift connection was established in a short time, all motor boats were launched, the steamer's cutters are lowered into the water and with them all the provisions, primarily rice for the Indians, the mail and other equipment are brought on board in eight hours of uninterrupted work.

- 183a -

continued

18.11.40

"PINGUIN" as Norwegian Wilhelmsen Liner "TAMERLANE" from "NOWSHERA".

- 184 -



	continued
	18.11.40	Crew of the steamer on board:

- 185 -

continued

18.11.40

	Captain	Collins	John
1st	Officer	Cooke	Josef
2nd	"	Stephens	Allan
3rd	"	Chisholm	Lawrence
1st	Engineer	Higgins	Charles
2nd	"	Philp	Ronald
3rd	"	Carrod	William
4th	"	Kendall	John
4th	"	Pasco	James
Engineer Asst.		Bellow	Robert
	"	Dixon	Thomas
	"	Harrison	James
Officer Cand..		Simpson	Haro
	"	Hatton	Austin
Radio Officer		Rowsend	John
Passenger		Growther	Dudly
Doctor		Mitra	Mrityunjoy (Indian)

Further 2 Englander, 1 Irish, 1 Chinese and 92 Indians.

E u r o p e a n s

- 186 -



	continued
	18.11.40



			Entire crew

		Afterwards, demolition charges were prepared using four blasting boxes mounted outboard and an electric igniter.

- 187 -



	continued
	18.11.40	31°02'S 100°51'E
	12.00	SbyE 4-5, Sea 3-4, cloudy, Vis. good
	14.09		Steamer blown up.


			After just a few seconds, the steamer sinks into the water up to the heel, so that the demolition team barely has time to cast off.

			and after 6 minutes the steamer is on an even keel.

- 188 -



	continued
	18.11.40

		heeled over to port,

- 189 -



	continued
	18.11.40
	14.15	21°00'S 100°51'E	Sunk.
		[typo 31°00'S ]

- 190 -



	continued
	18.11.40		Recovered boats and headed for the meeting point with "STORSTAD".

	18.18		"STORSTAD" in sight 30° to starboard.
			After brief signal traffic (new sailing instructions).

	19.54		"STORSTAD" released according to plan.

		The Captain J.N. C o l l i n s from English steamer "NOWSHERA" said the following when questioned by the Prisoner Officer:

		The "NOWSHERA" was on the journey from Adelaide to Durban. She had 8100 tons of cargo and 1500 tons of coal, which was to be supplied in Durban on board. The cargo was intended for England. The time from which the ship was to proceed in convoy was unknown, but probably Freetown. The armament on board consisted of one 10.2 cm cannon, which came aboard in Calcutta, and a machine gun as anti aircraft protection. Three gunners were in charge of the artillery on board. Shortly before the stopping shot was fired, the Watch Officer reported to him that a dimmed vessel was in sight. He gave a long blast on the steamer's whistle to call the crew on deck. He did not give orders to radio or fire. He had the gun crew, who had lined up at the gun, brought from the gun to the boats. He did not expect to be picked up by the German auxiliary cruiser and was very surprised and pleased by the "fair" treatment he received on board the German warship.
		Although he was already retired, he was forced by his shipping company to take command of the "NOWSHERA", which was the first ship to sail to England in the war. He was threatened with having his pension withdrawn if he refused the command.
		He left Adelaide with deployed otters. The course to steer was up to him. He had to stay clear of the 100 fathom limit. Secret papers and code were destroyed on his order after the stopping.
		Order concerning the artillery were from the Third Officer. The cannon was exercised daily and about every 6 weeks a shooting exercise was held.

- 191 -



	continued
	18.11.40	The only information he knew about ship losses due to mine hits was the radio reports; he never saw any warships or aircraft in or around Adelaide.
		He had received no news from the Australian Navy about raiders in the Indian Ocean. He had thought he would get to Durban unscathed.
		In this war he had not yet been to England, but had been on coastal voyages. In the last war he was mainly active in the Mediterranean. Apart from a Japanese fisherman near the coast of Australia, he did not see any ships on this voyage until 18 November.
		He had no information about Australian auxiliary cruisers or patrol services.




	19.11.40	31°13'S 102°53'E	Shifted position line somewhat to the south and moved back and forth in new position line.
	12.00	SE 4, Sea 3-4, overcast, Vis. good
		SE 4, Sea 3-4, overcast, Vis. good	Continued engine overhaul.

	20.11.40
	05.00		Smoke cloud in sight 70° to port (165°T). The second engine can be ready in 1 to 2 hours.

	05.01		Came to 11 knots and closed.

	05.25		Bearing shifted just a bit aft (162°T).
			Closed on course 210°.

	Sun and Moon Data 18.11.40
	Sun and Moon Data 19.11.40
	Sun and Moon Data 20.11.40

- 192 -



	continued
	20.11.40
	05.44		Came to 12 knots with both engines.
			The second engine, is now fully overhauled, turned slowly to break it in.
			Came further to course 191°.

	06.10		From the foremast: Smokestack in sight.

	06.20		Masts are distinguished, lie at a great distance from the smokestack, apparently a large steamer, lies transverse. Course 270° (south coast of Australia - Africa) - so again a steamer with cargo.

	06.29		Came to course 260°, a course to run with, to get an indication of enemy speed.

	06.32		Between the bridge and smokestack and behind the smokestack pole masts area seen. Steamer runs at more than 9 knots.

	07.00		Bearing 188°T, 28000 meters. By plotting ran at 12 knots.

	07.20		Bearing 191°T, 24500 meters. Steamer turned away slowly. Tried to proceed smoke-free.

	07.25		Steamer turned away hard 70-80°.

		The steamer had sighted us and turned away as prescribed. So he would be reached by day after many hours of pursuit, during which he will have the opportunity to send a radio signal for hours. Therefore I'll let him run out of visual range and intend to keep him in sight, always by his clouds of smoke that give him away from 25 to 30 nautical miles away, and to maneuver ahead myself unseen in order to surprise him from ahead in the first dark hours of the night, so that he will not have much time to send radio signals.

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	continued
	20.11.40
	07.42		The steamer turns back to its westerly course. Its lookout height is apparently lower, it can no longer see us, while we can still see its masts and funnel.

	07.52		Came to 13 knots.

	08.07		Came to 14 knots.

		In the course of the morning the weather was better and better, seas and above all the SW-Swell are decreasing, so that the use of the aircraft can be considered. I decide, to set out the aircraft outside of visual range and rip away the steamer's antenna with the aircraft to stop it from transmitting and have it bombed if it doesn't follow instructions. Just as the "NOWSHERA" was prevented by the sudden close encounter at night due to the surprise and the darkness, so this will be achieved by day through the antenna ripping and the presence of the aircraft.

	13.24		After agreeing on signals set out the aircraft without difficulties despite the swell.

	13.32		After driving to make a duck pond, the launch succeeds to the greatest joy of the whole ship. This is the first take-off of aircraft No. 2 since the burning of the first plane.
			The ship came to full speed and turned towards the steamer.

	13.43		The aircraft is at the steamer and tore the antenna away on the first approach. By the later report of the Flying Officer all the harness between the masts came down. The aircraft was shot at while flying off. Approached from the front to throw the reporting bag. Since the bag could not be observed

- 194 -



	continued
	20.11.40	to the end, a second bag was thrown in a new approach from aft, which fell on the bridge, with the following contents:
		"Stop your engines immediately.
		Do not use wireless.
		In case of disobedience or any resistance you will be bombed and shelled."

	13.50	The first bomb is thrown in steeply guided flight, which fell into the water about half a ship’s width from the hull at the level of the bridge.

	13.51	Steamer turns away hard.

	13.54	Second bomb thrown, falls armed, about 15 meters ahead of the bow.

	13.59	Steamer smokes.

	14.03	Steamer gave aircraft warning report by Radio Message.
		33 picked up the hunt at maximum speed.

	14.03	Steamer gave position, apparently apparently he quickly pulled out an emergency antenna. It is the English steamer "MAIMOA", by Lloyd's Register 8011 GRT, 13-14 knots, cold storage rooms.

	14.15	Bearing 149°T, 21500 meters.

	14.19	Steamer now transmits with his proper transmitter, apparently his system is fully operational again. He sends RRR-report with Position and name.

	14.25	Aircraft flies back and reports:
		"Antenna is torn away"
		"Steamer does not stop"
		"Cannon is not manned"

- 195 -



	continued
	20.11.40		"Anti-aircraft manned"
			Afterwards flew off again after the steamer.

	14.50		"STORSTAD" receives order to move off to a square far to the NW. The steamer transmits repeatedly, the aircraft carries out mock attacks on it. The steamer then makes hard rudder maneuvers and lays smoke.

	14.57		The steamer reports he is hunted, steers 150° at 11 knots. With 3-4 knot speed excess can be in shooting range in about 2 hours.

	15.30		The aircraft reports it must land. Receives order: "Land!"

	15.34		"PINGUIN" resumes the hunt immediately after launching the boat. The weather is calm, the aircraft and cutter are left alone.

	15.40		Bearing 150°T, 14500 meters.

	16.05		"STORSTAD" reports: Steamer in sight, distance 18000, runs on course 114°. Unfortunately, this report is not usable for us at the moment.

	16.07	31°16.5'S 102°10.5'E	1st and 6th cannons exposed.
		SEbyE 3, Sea 2, overcast, Vis. good
	16.12		Bearing 152°T, 10500 meters.
			The flag can be seen on the steamer’s gaff.

- 196 -



	continued
	20.11.40
	16.37	Bearing 150°T, 8000 meters.

	16.40	Battery unmasked.

	16.42	Flag signal:
		"Stop immediately!"
		Opened fire with a double shot across the bow.

	16.42.5	2 further double salvos.
		The steamer runs on.

	16.44	15 cm battery permission to open fire: 1st salvo short,
	16.44.5	2nd salvo also short.
		Steamer lowers the flag, ceased fire.
		The cannon is not manned, he stops and blows off steam.

	16.46	Boats were put to the water, the crew abandons ship quickly without orders.

	16.50	Launched prize boat.


		The Examination Officer receives instructions, that the crew is to abandon ship immediately

- 197 -



	continued
	20.11.40	and should row to"PINGUIN".



		The demolition is prepared immediately and carnied out.

	16.53	Flag Signal: "I'll send a boat!"
		"Abandon the ship as quickly as possible."

	17.03	Signal understood. Meanwhile at the steamer 6 boats were launched and occupied by the larger part of the white crew.

	17.12	Prize crew on board. The steamer was searched briefly, charts and a few provision boxes were put in the boat.
		87-man crew was taken on board.

- 198 -



	continued
	20.11.40
	18.25	Demolition crew lay off. 3 demolition charges are set off.

	18.32	3 detonations.


		Steamer begins to sink.

		At first a light list to starboard, then it rolls to port and slowly

- 199 -



	continued
	20.11.40	settled deeper forward.



		The fore deck is under water.

- 200 -



	continued
	20.11.40
	19.15	34°14'S 100°56'E	"MAIMOA" sinks.


			Examination Officer reports:
			Steamer with cooling rooms, meat, grain, butter, lard and piece goods. From Fremantle to Durban and England. Secret items destroyed. Left Adelaide on an easterly course. The English were determined to stay in the boats and had to be forced to come on board.

	19.16		Moved off at highest speed to the aircraft.

	20.50		Reached the aircraft

	21.10		Aircraft and cutter were recovered without mishap despite the darkness.
			Ran off at full speed to the meeting point with "STORSTAD".
			The Flying Officer reports that its radar received machine gun fire and had 4 hits in the floats. After landing the floats had to be pumped continually, The tearing of the antenna went smoothly.

- 201 -

continued

20.11.40

Until then he had occupied 600-meter steamer wavelength, but switched off after the antenna was torn away and threw out his antenna tearing device later. So the steamer could erect his emergency antenna put and transmit unhindered and unnoticed by the aircraft.

Since the presence of the auxiliary cruiser is known due to the persistent calls for help from the steamer, which also tried to describe the auxiliary cruiser (we had interrupted it), at full speed I follow the "STORSTAD" which had been sent ahead to the NW.

The intended reason for using the aircraft - to capture the steamer to sea without radio calls for help - was unfortunately not achieved.

It might have been achieved if

1) If one of the two bombs had hit the steamer, it would have served as an emphatic reinforcement of the written order to stop and maintain radio silence.

2) The raising of the emergency antenna was recognized by the aircraft and this too was torn again.

I regret the radio call especially because the need to leave the site quickly means that it is no longer possible to dismantle this valuable supply steamer for our own purposes (butter, eggs).

Crew of the ?MAIMOA":

Captain		Cox	Herbert
1st	Officer	Wordgates	René
2nd	"	Weller	A.E.
3rd	"	Carroll	John
4th	"	Fairgrieve	Gordon
Officer Cand..		Saddington	Charles
	"	Mortimer	David
1st	Engineer	Mc Gowon	David
2nd	"	Walker	O.S.
3rd	"	Williamson	D.J.
4th	"	Howlett	J.E.R.
5th	"	M.Dunsher	Ross

	Sun and Moon Data 22.11.40
	Sun and Moon Data 23.11.40
	Sun and Moon Data 24.11.40

- 202 -

continued

20.11.40

6th	Engineer	Thomas	W.J.
7th	"	Woodeard	Gaffrey
1st	Refrig. Eng.	B. Kelly	William
2nd	"	Metcalfe	Reginald
1st	Radio. Off.	Bolland	Reginald
2nd	"	Boocock	Phillip

68 English, 1 Australian

When questioned by the Prisoner Officer, Captain H.S. Cox of the English Steamer "NAIMOA" said:

The "MAIMOA" was en route from Fremantle, where she took on water and received course instructions, to Durban and then on to an unknown port in England. In Durban the coal stock, which amounted to around 1700 tons on 20 November, was to be replenished. The speed of the "MAIMOA" was 11 knots, the coal consumption at this speed was around 57 tons per day. Fremantle was left on 17 November and one hoped to be in Durban on 5 December. Captain Cox said the size of the ship since the beginning of the year was 10123 GRT. The "MAIMOA" was re-surveyed at the beginning of the year because it came under government control. This trip was a government-commissioned trip. The cargo consisted of frozen meat in cooling rooms, butter, lard (altogether 5000 tons), piece goods, steel

- 203 -



	continued
	20.11.40	rods and wheat. All together 8000 tons of cargo on board. The crew amounted to 87 men, for which there was plenty of food on board. The larger part of the crew came aboard in London. It was not easy to find suitable people, but finally he left London with a full crew.
		He was given instructions to sail from Fremantle to Durban and when captured he steered 270°. He destroyed all secret documents before the ship was captured. Since Fremantle the "MAIMOA" had seen 2 ships, namely 19 November at 03.00 hours a dimmed steamer 5 nm away on the opposite course, and on the morning of 20 November one running on a parallel course to starboard, that he overhauled and was no longer seen in the afternoon. In the evening this steamer came in sight again. He suspected it to be a German auxiliary cruiser, to which the aircraft which tore away the antenna shortly before belonged. He had the aircraft shot at because he believed he had a small chance of escape. For this reason, he did not stop, but turned and at the same time transmitted signals. Apart from the fact that he was being attacked by an aircraft and pursued by suspicious vessels, he radioed the position and description of the suspicious vessel (black paint, white stripe, pole masts, short masts and short funnel). He did not give a description of the superstructure. As armament he had a 10.2 cm cannon, one anti-aircraft gun and 2 revolvers on board. 2 gunners and 7 men manned the cannon and anti-aircraft gun. He only observed the impact and detonation of one bomb about 20 meters ahead of the ship. When the German auxiliary cruiser stopped him, he gave the order to abandon ship. He had no intention of using his cannon, as he realized that his weak armament would be of no use against a warship.
		He ran the "MAIMOA for three years as Captain. During this war he was in England three times. They usually sailed from New Zealand to Bermuda and from there in convoy for England. On his last trip he left in convoy from the Bristol Channel. The convoy was dissolved at sea.

- 204 -



	continued
	20.11.40	The speed of the convoy was 7 knots.
		Like many other prisoners, he knows the stories of empty boats found drifting in the Indian Ocean shot by machine guns. Personally, he did not believe that he would be shot by the Germans, but he also did not expect to be taken on board the German auxiliary cruiser.
		When asked about warship movements and air reconnaissance, he refused to comment and at the same time stated that he did not know anything special about it.
		He had heard from press reports about ships being lost due to mine hits on the Australian coast. He knew of two total losses, the American freighter "CITY OF RAYVILLE" and an English steamer whose name he did not know.


	21.11.40
	06.15		The "STORSTAD" ahead to the northwest reported a steamer in sight.
			If the steamer steers a west course, it must come in sight on the northwest course of the "PINGUIN".

	09.04		Smoke feather in sight 80° to starboard. Bearing 03.5°T. Turned to a parallel course. From the foremast the mast and smokestack of a steamer are soon recognized. Turned to the exact parallel course of 270° (the level of the mast and the smokestack remain the same on this course, that means the range is steady) to plot the exact speed.

	11.05		"STORSTAD" reports: Have a steamer in sight, course of the steamer 275°, speed 13 knots, Apparently it was the same steamer.
			"STORSTAD" gets a meeting point further west.

	Sun and Moon Data 20.11.40
	Sun and Moon Data 21.11.40

- 205 -



	continued
	21.11.40		In the course of the afternoon the speed of the steamer was plotted at 11 knots.

	12.00	30°03'S 98°40'E
		ESE 1, Sea 1, cloudy, Vis. good
			I intend, to run alongside the steamer out of sight until after dark, then approach under cover of darkness and stop it by surprise. This makes it possible for the steamer not to transmit (see "NOWSERA").

	20.51		Turned towards on course 313° and came to 15 knots.

	21.03		The shadow of the steamer unexpectedly comes in sight 40° to starboard. It seems to have changed course after dark.

	21.15		Went to Action Stations.
			Stopping gun, 1st and 6th cannon, anti-aircraft weapons and searchlight uncovered.

	21.25		Battery unmasked. Closed at highest speed. The steamer holds course, so doesn't see us.

	22.00		Bearing 274°T, 3000 meters.

	22.03		Searchlight illuminated, 1 shot before the bow.
			Searchlight blinding.

	22.05		Morse traffic: A -- A - A - stop - A - A - stop - A
			1 shot before the bow.

	22.06		Searchlight illuminate, the steamer still doesn't respond.

- 206 -



	continued
	21.11.40
	22.08	The steamer transmits: "RRR" - Interference sets in -
		Battery permission to open fire. 3.7 cm permission to open fire.
		Hit in the radio shack, smokestack, over deck amidships and ruder motor. The steamer stops transmitting.

	22.10	"Halt, Battery halt".

	22.11	Morse traffic: "What ship?"
		No answer, the bridge is abandoned.
		The radio shack, after edge of the smokestack burn.
		In searchlight illumination is was distinguished.
		English steamer "PORT BRISBANE", gray flush decker with bright brown superstructure, 8739 GRT, built in 1923, London, 13-14 knots, cooling rooms.
		To both sides of the rudder entire house on the stern each one 15 cm cannon, on the poop an anti-aircraft gun, range finder and control station.
		The crew abandons ship in 3 boats in great disorder, the 4th is destroyed. On the forecastle bow protection gear with 4 otters.

	22.39	The Examination crew is away, with orders to destroy the steamer immediately and return.

	22.50	The examination crew gets on board and prepares to destroy the ship.

	23.00	The 60 man crew and one woman were taken aboard from two boats. The third boat disappeared in the darkness.
		Search with the searchlight is unsuccessful.

	23.14	In the foreship 3 demolition charges are set and detonated electrically. 3 detonations. Examination crew disembarks.

- 207 -



	continued
	21.11.40
	23.20		The steamer begins to settle forward.

	23.26		The "RRR-report" was repeated by another steamer at very loud Volume with position and name. Now that I have been reported by radio by the second steamer, I intend to head south as quickly as possible
			"STORSTAD" receives orders, to go to the south. After the examination crew is back on board the Examination Officer reports:
			From Adelaide for Durban - bound for England. Again a very valuable refrigeration room ship with 5000 tons of meat, butter and cheese. 3000 tons of wool. One passenger on board for Durban. The steamer was taken completely by surprise. Cannons and ammunition hoist were manned. 3 lightly wounded. 1 Officer dead in the vicinity of the smokestack. In the meantime "PINGUIN" went around the burning steamer 2 times. Nothing is seen of the third boat, the crew doesn't give light signals like the others. Searching with the searchlight is unsuccessful. The boat either sank during the sinking or the crew rowed away.

	23.50		The steamer doesn't sink further, It is a ship with multiple compartments and refrigerated compartments and floats well. Because of the radio messages and the widely visible glow of the burning radio shack, it is no longer advisable to stay any longer, so the steamer was torpedoed.

	23.54	29°29'S 95°35'E	Torpedo fire. Hit at the level of the bridge.
			Steamer now settles deeper quickly by the bow.

- 208 -

continued

21.11.40

I won't wait any longer for it to sink, instead run.

22.11.40

00.07

At full speed, initially 10 knots, ran to the east to possibly deceived the third boat in the vicinity.

01.00

Course 211°, ran off at highest speed.

[names on this list marked with [?] are difficult to make out]

From the steamer "PORT BRISBANE" there are now on board:

Captain		Steele	Harry
1st	Officer	Hudson	Charles
3rd	"	Konrad	Ernest
4th	"	Armitage	Laurence
1st	Engineer	Campbell	Archibald
2nd	"	Stevenson	John C.
1st	Radio Off.	Hagseth	John
2nd	"	Fradsoge [?]	Ernest
Paymaster		Stevens	F.N.
Officer Cand.		Holland	John
4th	Engineer	Bowan	Thomas
5th	"	Wallace	James
6th	"	Carr	D. Reginald
Passenger		Mohane [?]	Kara May

46 Englanders and 1 Finn.

	Sun and Moon Data 21.11.40
	Sun and Moon Data 22.11.40

	- 209 -



		continued
		22.11.40

- 210 -



	continued
	22.11.40
		Captain H. S t e e l e from the sunken English freighter "PORT BRISBANE" said the following when questioned by the Prisoner Officer:
		Steamer "PORT BRISBANE", 8743 GRT, was on the way from Adelaide for Durban. The crew amounted to 89 men, additionally there were also 2 sailors in need of assistance and one passenger on board. One of the 2 seaman in need of assistance was Finnish. The cargo consisted of 5000 tons of meat, butter and cheese, as well as 500 tons lead, 300 tons piece goods and 2 337 tons of wool. The meat was in the refrigeration room as frozen meat.
		The armament consisted of 1 stern cannons 15 cm, and an anti-aircraft gun. One range finder was aft, armor was installed on the bridge and aft. Signal to set Action Stations was a long and three short tones. This signal was given with the steamer whistle, when the searchlight illuminated the "PORT BRISBANE". The gun crews on the protected platforms were recalled by the 3rd Officer on the orders of the Captain and sent to the boats. The Captain, believed that they would have been completely destroyed if they had engaged in combat.
		Her armament was installed in October 1939 in Sydney. The three gun captains on board were members of the Australian Navy. The 15 cm gun was built in 1906, the 8.8 cm anti-aircraft gun in 1939.
		There were three lifeboats on board. The third lifeboat, which was manned by 30 men and commanded by the 2nd Officer, was lost from sight when it was near the ship. Although he, the Captain, had given orders to stay with the ship, the Second Officer apparently left on purpose. His people expressed their wish not to board the auxiliary cruiser, but rather to row to Fremantle. He himself was convinced that they would be welcomed and well treated on the auxiliary cruiser. Relatives of ship crews whose steamers had been attacked by the "GRAF SPEE" had told him about the good treatment on board German warships.

- 211 -



	continued
	22.11.40
		All secret papers were destroyed before abandoning ship.
		During this war he and his ship were in England (Liverpool) twice. On one of these trips they sailed through the Panama Canal to join other ships in Bermuda to form a convoy. On the other trip they sailed from Freetown to England in a convoy with 45 ships.
		He left Adelaide with his otter gear deployed. He was free to choose his own course. He only had to stay outside the 100 fathoms limit and then steer towards the 30th parallel.
		The lookout was manned in the foremast and aft at the range measuring device. All steamers, plumes of smoke, etc. were avoided in good time. Drifting debris spotted on 20 November caused him to change course to the north.
		He did not see any warships in Adelaide. He did not observe any aircraft at sea or near the coast.
		On mines in Australian waters, he was only able to report the number of ships sunk due to mine hits that had been published in the press. On 20 November, he learned from his radio operator that a minesweeper and a cargo steamer had sunk in a collision off Port Phillip. On the journey from Melbourne to Adelaide he stayed 12 nm off Otway, his coal inventory on 21 November was 1400 tons, He consumed 70 tons per day and was to supplement the coal inventory in Durban. Provisions were on board for the whole trip.
		He got the otter gear on board in Australia a few weeks ago and practiced with it according to the instructions.
		The "PORT BRISBANE" was originally built as an auxiliary cruiser, hence its heavy armament. In 1929, it was decommissioned as an auxiliary cruiser due to its low speed.
		He would have to acknowledge that we had searched for the missing boat for over an hour with the Second Officer and 29 men.
		Since the boats were very well equipped, it is considered possible that the Second Officer's boat reached the Australian coast.

- 212 -



	continued
	22.11.40
		Additional statement from Captain S t e e l e on 26 November 1940:

		In addition to his previous statement, Steele stated on the contrary that he had received information from the British Admiralty about German raiders in overseas waters. According to this, it is assumed that there are 2 German "Raiders" in the Pacific Ocean, 2 in the Indian Ocean and 1 in the Atlantic (near the West Indies). These were brought to the attention of his men in order to increase their attention to the lookout.


		The gun leader D.J. W i l l i a m s from the English freighter "PORT BRISBANE" said:

		He joined the steamer "PORT BRISBANE" in Sydney on 27 April 1940 as a gun leader. On board "PORT BRISBANE" were two 15 cm long-barreled guns and an 8.8 cm anti-aircraft gun. The gun crew consisted of 7 men. There was regular watch at the guns, and one man from the gun crew or gun leader was always on the afterdeck. The signal to take up the battle station was one long and three short blasts from the steam whistle. On 20 November, when they were stopped by the German auxiliary cruiser, only the three gunners rushed to the guns when the alarm sounded, all the other people got the boats ready. They did not load the guns, but rushed to the boats because they could not operate the guns alone. Normally there were always 30 rounds of 15 cm guns on the upper deck.
		A salesman in Hobart, he was drafted into the navy at the beginning of the war, trained as a gunner on land and joined the "PORT BRISBANE" in April 1940, without having previously served on ships of the navy or merchant navy.
		Ammunition was replenished on the voyage in Sydney. On the Captain's orders, gun drills were carried out daily. Once on the voyage out and once on the voyage home, live fire was fired at a target that was thrown overboard and allowed to drift, at a distance of about 4000 meters at an own speed of 10 knots. Each gun fired an average of four shots.

- 213 -



	continued
	22.11.40	Of these four shots, one hit was always made.
		On a special incident in New York on 20 August 1940, which Williamson noted in his diary, which is in our possession, he stated that he came on board this evening drunk, took his watch at 02.00 hours, leaned over the roiling, lost his balance and fell into the water. He was rescued by the New York Police.
		Now and then they received information from the Captain about the appearance of German raiders. There were supposedly 7 "raiders" in the Pacific Ocean.
		Neither he nor his comrades believed that they would be picked up by the German auxiliary cruiser. Williamson was unable to provide any information about warship movements or aircraft activity.




		The German press announced today on the radio that the British steamer "DOMINGO DE LARRINAGA" was sunk in the Atlantic by German submarines, and that the Norwegian tanker "STORSTAD" is overdue for more than 20 days on its way from Dairen to the American west coast.
		Both reports seem a bit strange to us.

- 214 -



	continued
	22.11.40	31°39'S 94°15'E
	12.00	Calm, Sea 0, clear, Vis. good

		Went further south. The German radio broadcast confirmed the statement by the captain of the "PORT BRISBANE" that an Australian minesweeper sank with its entire crew in the entrance to Port Phillip after colliding with an unknown steamer.
		At the same time, Australian radio stations issued a navigation warning about a wreck there whose mast tip was sticking out of the water.



	MOZ 90°E	[GMT +6]
	========
	23.11.40	34°52'S 94°35'E	Radio Perth is openly warning against sailing on a 4-point narrow sea strait between Sydney and Newcastle.
	12.00	W 2-3, Sea 2, overcast, Vis. good


		Our fouling, which was deployed just below Norah Head, is not yet detected in this warning area.
		So something must have already happened there too.
		The "carrying out of difficult mine tasks in foreign waters" was recognized by the award of 5 Iron Cross 1 and a further 50 Iron Cross 2 by the Ob.d.M.

	Sun and Moon Data 22.11.40
	Sun and Moon Data 23.11.40

- 215 -




	24.11.40	34°21'S 92°56'E	Kommandanten muster.
	12.00	SE 3-4, Sea 3, overcast, Vis. good	Award of the Iron Crosses.
			Received the pleasant news of the happy arrival of the prize "NORDVARD" in Bordeaux.


	25.11.40	34°22'S 88°53'E
	12.00	E 3, Sea 2, overcast, Vis. good

		Radio Message from Skl. concerning Antarctic Task
		By which continue on the Australia-Cape Route until 10 December, then the Bouvet area. From February onwards assigned to the West Indian Ocean to carry out mine task on the west coast of the Indian subcontinent.
		I intend to head back to 31°S with "STORSTAD" at around 80°E in order to search there with both ships.
		The engine overhaul is progressing as planned. In this context, it's nevertheless remarkable and pleasing that the second major "success series" of the "PINGUIN" fell during the engine overhaul and was not affected by it.

	Sun and Moon Data 24.11.40
	Sun and Moon Data 25.11.40

- 216 -




	26.11.40	33°07'S 85°44'E
	12.00	NE 1-2, Sea 1, clear, Vis. good

		From radio reports it appears that Ship 16 has sunk 95000 tons so far (great!) and intends to overhaul at Kerguelen (so the same, what we do currently in special night work). Furthermore, Ship 16 is to have the Bay of Bengal as its area of operations for January and February. This contradicts the order just issued by the Skl. - to allocate the West Indian Ocean to Ship 33 - and makes it impossible to carry out mine-laying tasks on the west coast of the Indian subcontinent, which can only be carried out by surprise.

	27.11.40	32°13'S 82°58'E
	12.00	NE 1-2, Sea 1, clear, Vis. good	No particular events.

	MOZ 75°E	[GMT +5]
	=======
	28.11.40	30°52'S 79°32'E
	12.00	WbyS 2-3, Sea 1-2, cloudy, Vis. good

		Engine overhaul has ended.
		The ship is fully operational again. The assigned soldiers did an excellent job. At the same time, the ship's exterior up to the waterline was painted (black) so that in this respect too it could enter the bad weather zone.
		The German radio news from London announces that "PORT BRISBANE" was sunk by a German warship and that an Australian warship found a lifeboat with 27 survivors and landed them in Australia.

	Sun and Moon Data 26.11.40
	Sun and Moon Data 27.11.40
	Sun and Moon Data 28.11.40

- 217 -



	continued
	28.11.40	23.00 hours News:
		London further announces:
		"The attack on "PORT BISBANE" took place at night. The German warship destroyed the bridge and the radio station with artillery fire. The steering engine failed. One boat with 27 survivors was picked up by an Australian warship. Two boats with the remaining crew were taken by the German warship. The same Australian warship also found a drifting empty lifeboat of the British freighter "MAIMOA". It is believed in London that the "MAIMOA" was sunk by the same German warship and that the crew was taken prisoner.


		With these publications, the activities and success of a German warship in this sea area will be made known to the wider public. Since this is happening at a time when I'm leaving this sea area anyway after some gratifying successes, I justify these publications and consider them likely to cause uncertainty and unrest for a while even after leaving Australian waters.
		I was also struck by the unintentional loss of a lifeboat and the landing of these people. They didn't’ know anything about our ship, so they can’t describe it, but they will tell us about the hit in the radio shack, the rudder engine etc.
		Such narratives will spread very quickly in the relevant circles.

	29.11.40	30°28'S 75°16'E
	12.00	ESE 4, Sea 3-4, cloudy, Vis. good

	Sun and Moon Data 28.11.40
	Sun and Moon Data 29.11.40

- 218 -



	continued
	29.11.40
		According to the report of the Captain of the "STORSTAD", Oblt.z.S. Levit, the assessment of the tanker's engine system by the Norwegians, who have been using the "PASSAT" again since it was taken out of service, is much more positive. When asked, the Captain also thought the system was old, but still suitable for longer periods of operation under normal circumstances. I therefore return to the old wish to make the tanker's valuable diesel load available for our naval warfare. Since I would also like to avoid, if at all possible, embarking on the Antarctic mission with the number of prisoners, which has now risen to 316, I have decided to send the "STORSTAD" home with the prisoners as a prize. The prisoners can be accommodated in the empty superstructure of the poop, which served as a mine room, and in Hatch I and under the forecastle. It will of course only be possible to do this in a very primitive way, and attempts must also be made to put heating in these rooms. In itself, a tanker with its clear layout on deck is well suited to the intended purpose.
		I intend to report the intention of sending the diesel oil home and making it available to Skl. by radio when the opportunity arises, so that the prize can be informed of the planned meeting points in the Atlantic before it is released. However, the shortage of provisions and the high number of prisoners do not allow for a longer stay in waiting positions.





	30.11.40
	04.00		Came aoout with both ships. Course 90°.

	11.30		"STORSTAD" reports steamer in sight on W-course, came about and angled in.

	Sun and Moon Data 29.11.40
	Sun and Moon Data 30.11.40

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	continued
	30.11.40		"STORSTAD" will be released to a fixed rendezvous point 3 days' journey to the southwest in anticipation of a long hunt to the west.

	12.00	30°37'S 73°23'E
		EbyN 4, Sea 3-4, cloudy, Vis. good

	17.00		Smoke cloud comes in sight. Steered a parallel course, without being seen ourselves. Speed and course of the steamer plotted, 260°, 12-13 knots.

	19.30		Closed in after it got dark. From the experience on taking "PORT BRISBANE", which did not respond to Morse calls and orders not to radio and used the time until fire was opened to radio anyway, I am now determined to immediately attack this steamer with artillery in order to put her out of action if she is sailing with her lights off - which is to be regarded as hostile.

	20.00		Raised the war watch, bow cannon, 1st and 6th cannon unmasked.

	20.10		Closed on course 245° at highest speed 15.5 knots.

	21.50		120° to port smoke cloud in sight. The night is very dark (new moon) the horizon barely distinguishable, somewhat misty. Stopped to let the steamer pass and the close up from astern, because experience shows that attention to the stern is very limited.

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	continued
	30.11.40
	22.30	Took up the hunt at highest speed. Managed to approach unseen from astern to starboard to 2200 meters.

	23.51	Steamer turned away hard, he has noticed us. Illuminated searchlight. Opened fire. Already with the 1st salvo hit in the radio shack and in the ruder engine. There were further hits in the smokestack and stern and the, because the cannon was not manned and the radio shack began to burn, ceased fire. Apparently the steamer had ruder failure, turned away hard to starboard, stopped and ran on.



	2354

		The steamer does not respond to the Morse call; the bridge appears to be deserted. After a few minutes, boats are launched and the crew abandons ship.
		Steamer "PORT WELLINGTON" 8501 GRT, 13-14 knots, coal fired, she same heavy armament as "PORT BRISBANE", 2 15 cm on the stern, on the poop 1 anti-aircraft gun, range measurement, control platform, again a refrigeration ship.

	01.12.40
	00.20	Examination crew went aboard with orders to sent the boats with the crew to "PINGUIN", then to to extinguish the fire, because the steamer as a refrigeration ship contains valuable provisions for us, otherwise prepare for demolition.

	00.30	Examination and demolition teams on board. In the meantime 3 boats with the large 82-man crew and 7 passengers were taken over.

	Sun and Moon Data 30.11.40
	Sun and Moon Data 01.12.40

- 221 -

continued

01.12.40

	Captain	Thomas	N.Oliver
1st	Officer	Barley	Fr.William
2nd	"	Bechen	Phillip
3rd	"	Broster	Friederic
4th	"	Gilham	Eric
1st	Engineer	Lookie	S.M.
2nd	"	Dillen	R.F.
3rd	"	Murray	G.
4th	"	Gray	G.
5th	"	Holman	J.
6th	"	Pring	G.
	"
1st	Refrig. Eng.	Robertson	G.
2nd	" "	Howick	Herbert
Radioman		Uren	Ronald
Passenger		Best	Arthur
Officer Cand.		Hawke	S.J.
"	"	Smith	B.
Passenger		Fieldgate	John Louise
	"	Fox	Constance St.
		Maclean	Edith B.
		Best	Anne N.
		Sharp	Doris
		Wood	Mabel Betsy
		Mackenzie	Florence C.

and 65 Englanders.

- 222 -



	continued
	01.12.40

		The Captain is heavily wounded. The fire spreads from the radio shack to the entire center superstructure, clouds of smoke also come out of the engine, the fire cannot be extinguished.

	01.38	The Examination crew has already prepared the demolition and then comes back. 4 detonations, the steamer first take a list to starboard, however then lies on an even keel and begins to sink. However, like the "PORT BRISBANE" the steamer remains with the fore deck at the waterline for quite some time.

	01.41	Alarm!
		A shadow is seen by a lookout and was mistaken for an approaching steamer. Prize boat recovered and searchlights which have been shining all the time for work and investigation; were extinguished to determine the situation.
		Since there was no shadow to be seen on the horizon, which was completely invisible (the watch was probably deceived by the shadow of a long swell), ran back to the burning

- 223 -



	continued
	01.12.40		steamer and, as it was still lying there unchanged, launched the boat again for another demolition and sent the demolition team over.



			After mast
		Starboard 15 cm cannon at the stern \| Smokestack
			\| \| \|
			\| \| \|

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	continued
	01.12.40
	03.25		Two explosive charges were placed aft. 2 detonations. The steamer now sank rapidly, a lot of water penetrated aft and "PORT WELLINGTON" went by the afterstem, the bow jutting out of the water, going into the deep quickly.

	03.31	31°10.5'S 70°37'E

	03.32		Moved off on course 180° at 15 knots.

	12.00	32°56'S 70°29'E
		NWbyN 2, Sea 1-2, cloudy, Vis. good


		With 405 prisoners on board the carrying capacity of the ship is almost reached again. Furthermore, I consider the chances of getting a prize suitable for sending home - that is, a motor vessel of appropriate size - undamaged in this sea area to be very small. The main vessels sailing here are large coal-fired Australian steamers.
		I therefore finally decide to send the "STORSTAD" home as a prize with the prisoners and to send the intended radio message about this, as well as the report about the diesel fuel available, immediately at the place.
		The "STORSTAD" has already been ordered to sail to a meeting point to the southeast and after sending the radio message I want to leave this sea area at high speed to the south.

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	continued
	01.12.40	Radio Message to Skl.:
		"Intention before departure to Bouvet to send home STORSTAD 9 knots, good shortwave transmitter, 400 prisoners, 10 thousand tons Borneo diesel oil Gamma [specific weight] = 0.91. Request meeting point to use fuel for Atlantic warfare. Only lowest provisions offload possible. 79000 [tons sunk] without mines.

	17.00	Today's Wehrmacht report states, firstly, that a German auxiliary cruiser overseas has reported the sinking of 79,000 tons of enemy merchant shipping as the total result of its trade warfare to date. This does not include the successes of its mining activities.
		A great joy for the entire crew and above all a sign that our radio message was received.
		Official confirmation of the radio message arrives at night.

	MOZ 60°E	[GMT +4]
	========
	02.12.40	36°18'S 69°18'E	The Captain of the "PORT WELLINGTON", who suffered severe injuries to the knee and thigh from shell splinters, died last night of heart failure.
	12.00	NEbyN 2, Sea 1, overcast, Vis. medium

	11.30	36°18'S 69°23'E	The body was buried. Because of the many English prisoners on board, I have ordered the burial to be held in a solemn manner. In addition to a delegation from the Command, a delegation from the crew of "PORT WELLINGTON" and all the English captains will take part.
			The First Officer of the "PORT WELLINGTON" performed the burial; at his request, a member of the English Salvation Army who was traveling with him as a passenger said the prayer, and two English Captains handed the body of their comrade over to the sea.

	Sun and Moon Data 01.12.40
	Sun and Moon Data 02.12.40

- 226 -



	continued
	02.12.40




		[There is a missing photo (presumably of the funeral service) here]

- 227 -



	continued
	02.12.40



		When questioned by Prisoner Officer First Officer F.W. Bailey of the English steamer "PORT WELLINGTON" said the following:

		S.S. "PORT WELLINGTON" is a sister ship of the "FORT BRISBANE". It was on the way from Adelaide to Durban and England. "PORT WELLINGTON" was 8300 GRT, had two propellers and coal firing. The cargo consisted of 3000 tons meat, 440 tons cheese, 500 tons ore, 450 tons butter, 500 tons wool and 700 tons wheat, together 7300 tons. Since his ship, like all other British ships, was chartered to the government, he believed that the recipient of the cargo was primarily the British government. The crew amounted to 82 men; additionally there was still one man and seven females as passengers on board. These women - belonging to the "Salvation Army" - had just accompanied a children transport to Australia and were now going back to England.

- 228 -



	continued
	02.12.40	The "PORT WELLINGTON" has always sailed through the Panama Canal and then from Bermuda in a convoy to England. In August Swansea experienced several air raids. The port locations were not damaged in these attacks. Traffic there continued as normal. Put to sea from Swansea in convoy.
		On the Australian coast they always stayed outside the 100-fathom limit as ordered. On the way from Portland to Adelaide (11-13 November 1940) they did not deploy the Otter gear, apparently there was no order to deploy it. He no longer remembered the courses they had taken. Since they had not been given a specific course, they headed for the usual points, passed the 100-fathom line and then headed for Durban on 31°S latitude.
		There were no warships in Adelaide, only merchant ships, including the Swede (MIRABOCHA) and a Dutch passenger steamer ("ROYS"). He never saw any aircraft at sea or near land. On about 27 November 1940 they saw a steamer heading east, the only ship they saw until the capture. On the evening of the capture, the 4th officer was on watch. He saw us about 4 minutes before the first salvo and immediately reported to the Captain. He gave the order to change course to port. They manned the lookout aft and in the foretop in the danger zone (from Cape Town). In the Indian Ocean, the lookout in the foretop is only manned at night. Although they heard the distress signals from the "MAIMOA" and "PORT BRISBANE", they stayed on the prescribed track because they could not know which course the privateer would take and also assumed that, if fate would have it so, our aircraft could have found them even after a greater change in latitude.
		Their armament consisted of two 15 cm guns and an 8.8 cm anti-aircraft gun. They had no intention of firing because they did not expect any success from a battle with a warship. They would have telegraphed in any case. The first hit in our first salvo destroyed the radio shack. The missing first radio operator was not found. He assumes that the radio operator

- 229 -



	continued
	02.12.40	burned to death in his room. Further hits destroyed the steering gear aft, hit the funnel and the aft edge of the bridge house.
		He himself carried out daily gun exercises under the supervision of 3rd Officer and the three "Gunners" (Australian Navy). The last time sharpshooting at targets was done was on the penultimate departure.
		They did not believe that we would take them on board, but assumed that the boats would be left to drift. He had heard on the radio that all the crew of the "PORT BRISBANE" had been taken to Fremantle by a warship.
		Bailey only knew what was reported on the radio about mines in Australian waters. He suspected one German raider in the Indian Ocean. He had heard a few weeks ago about the capture of a Norwegian tanker in the north.
		In his opinion, Captain Thomas was injured by a splinter from the shell that hit the smokestack.
		Bailey had never had any experience of war before. The privateer who captured his ship is the first German warship he has come into contact with.
		The signal used for manning boats and battle stations is one long, six-tone blast from the steam whistle.
		The Captain had the secret papers in his safekeeping and probably destroyed them during the bombardment.


		Additional statement from the First Watch Officer of the "PORT WELLINGTON":

		At a second interrogation, Bailey told the Prisoner Officer:
		For him and his comrades, it was a matter of course that a German raider would have an aircraft on board. The story of the auxiliary cruiser "WOLF" is well known in maritime circles. Since it had an aircraft on board, it was safe to assume that a good 20 years later a

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	continued
	02.12.40	German merchant raider would also have an aircraft.
		No attempt was made to put out the fire in the radio shack. In his opinion, when he arrived on deck, the fire was so advanced that it would have been difficult to put out. Besides, their main concern was to get the boats in the water as quickly as possible. The launching of the boats went well. Since the event took place shortly before the change of watch, two watches were quickly available. The passengers were distributed among the boats, the boats were launched and filled with crew. The fourth boat could not be swung out because the rear runner and block had been damaged by a hit. The boats were equipped with about 40 gallons of water, plenty of biscuits, tinned meat and milk. He had increased the amount of boat outfitting required by about 40%. He also had a sextant and nautical books in the boat. No nautical charts had been taken along. His intention had been to sail north in good weather (up to about 27 or 28°S) and look for steamers there that could pick them up. He had not seen his brother-in-law, Captain Steele of the "PORT BRISBANE" for five years. As he assumed that we had captured the "PORT BRISBANE", he was not particularly surprised to find his brother-in-law on board. The news of the landing of the "PORT BRISBANE" crew in Fremantle was very general. His brother-in-law Steele greeted him in the prisoner's quarters with a loud "Hello", but without any particular surprise. He knew the departure times of the "PORT WELLINGTON" and, when he noticed that the auxiliary cruiser was busy with another capture on November 30th, he thought that the captured ship might be the "PORT WELLINGTON".
		At the end of this interrogation, First Officer Bailey declared, with some enthusiasm, that they were all very grateful to the Kommandanten and officers of the cruiser for the dignified manner in which they celebrated and attended the funeral of their late Captain Thomas.

- 231 -



	continued
	02.12.40	He also added that he, his comrades and his crew are pleased and happy with the "fair" treatment and reception here on board.




		Received congratulations to the ship on the "excellent success" of the ship.

		Ship 16 has requested a rendezvous with "STORSTAD". Skl. must agree to the request, as it corresponds to his own intentions.
		"STORSTAD" will initially remain in the Indian Ocean with ship 16, and later, if necessary, supply 45 and 36 with fuel.
		Ship 16 should try to get its other prize for sending the prisoners home, otherwise and in case of shortage of provisions, send them home via Ship 10 and NORDMARK.
		33 is to equip "STORSTAD" and report release to meeting point "Tulpe".





	03.12.40	36°04'S 64°32'E
	12.00	SWbyS 5, Sea 4-5, overcast, Vis. medium

		I believe meeting point "Tulpe" 36°S 65°E is currently very unsuitable for waiting and meeting with a tanker.

	Sun and Moon Data 02.12.40
	Sun and Moon Data 03.12.40

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	continued
	03.12.40	31°S is the main steamer route for the westbound loaded steamers. Two steamers were recently captured on it with distress calls, and two more sunk ships will be overdue in Durban in the next few days.
		In addition, two days ago I sent out the 15-minute radio message near meeting point "Tulpe" so that if defense sets in, in my opinion it should initially be taken by patrol duty by cruisers or auxiliary cruisers at around 30-31°S.
		Therefore, I intend to propose a southern meeting point in the report of the dismissal of "STORSTAD".




	04.12.40	35°45'S 60°02'E
	12.00	S 4-5, Sea 4, overcast, Vis. medium

	14.00		"STORSTAD" comes in sight.
			Based on a a further report from the Prize Commander, the Norwegian engine crew believes it is possible for the tanker to continue sailing for 2-3 months.

	Sun and Moon Data 03.12.40
	Sun and Moon Data 04.12.40

- 233 -



	continued
	04.12.40	I intend to outfit the prize with provisions and lubricating oil for a period of time, in which the ship would need to easily reach the French Atlantic coast from here. With only 8-9 knots of speed and plenty of reserve, this will take 60 days.
		The plan is to provide 60 days' provisions for the prize crew and 400 prisoners. The 80 Indians are not included in this, as they will receive their special provisions (primarily rice) separately.
		If "STORSTAD" remains with Ship 16 for a longer period of time, the provisions must be replenished accordingly by ship 16 before the prisoners are sent home - either on another prize or on "STORSTAD".
		The weather is unsuitable for outfitting, the seas are too great.
		Proceeded to the west together over night - still in visual range - .







	05.12.40
	08.00		Established tow connection. Began outfitting. There is not much swell and the sea is rough. By the afternoon, however, most of the provisions and all the Indians and their luggage are across. In addition, 230 tons of diesel oil are taken on board again - for the third and last time from "STORSTAD". Then 70 tons of drinking water are delivered.

	Sun and Moon Data 04.12.40
	Sun and Moon Data 05.12.40

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	continued
	05.12.40	36°03'S 58°03'E
	12.00	S 3-4, Sea 3, overcast, Vis. bad


		Ship 16 asks by radio message, how long he should wait at the rendezvous point; Skl. adds that so far no report from 33 has been received about the release of "STORSTAD".
		Since the outfitting will not take more than 2 working days and I suspect that Ship 16 will be near the meeting point "Tulpe" suggested by him, which I currently consider to be very unsuitable, I am aiming for ship 16 to come near my current outfitting place and take over the "STORSTAD" here.
		A discussion on the further exploitation of "STORSTAD", the destination of the 400 prisoners and my prize crew seems to me very useful besides general exchange of experiences.
		Therefore tonight's Short Signal:
			"Intend to meet you in
			Latitude = 35°
			Longitude = 60°
			on the 8th day of the month.



	06.12.40	35°52'S 57°42'E
	12.00	SSW 2, Sea 1, overcast, Vis. medium

		Skl. informs Ship 16 that "STORSTAD" will be released from us before 10 December and that, given the value of the ship, Ship 16 should wait.

	Sun and Moon Data 05.12.40
	Sun and Moon Data 06.12.40

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	continued
	06.12.40	I hope that 16 will be directed to us in the meantime.

		The outfitting of the "STORSTAD" and the setup of the prisoner quarters are being continued. The water to be transferred runs very slowly. Hoses with larger cross-sections must be available for such purposes.

		Skl. confirms the radio message in which I proposed meeting point with Ship 16, but assumes that the request is from Ship 16 and asks whether 33 can reach the meeting point on 8 December. Therefore, tonight Short Signal, by which 33 will be on time at meeting point.
		The facilities for accommodating the prisoners on "STORSTAD" were completed in the afternoon. The "NOWSHERA" and "MAIMOA" crews, who have already seen our ship during the day, were ferried across in the late afternoon. The crew of the two "PORT-Liners", who have not had a personal impression of the outside of the ship, were only ferried across after dark.


	07.12.40	35°04'S 58°55'E
	12.00	WbyS 1, Sea 1, clear, Vis. good

		Skl. confirmed the Short Signal, that I would be at the meeting point on time, but unfortunately Ship 16 did not comment.
		Moved back and forth in the vicinity of the meeting point.
		In the afternoon the Captain and the 8 women were transferred, their rooms on STORSTAD" were painted before.
		After that headed for the meeting point.

	Sun and Moon Data 06.12.40
	Sun and Moon Data 07.12.40